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1. Why a European Parallel Currency?
1.1. Roads to Monetary Union
 v
Ever since the late 1°-60
Ts when the aim of European monetary
unification became the object of Community ambitions, official
thinking on the subject has been dominated'by the idea that
monetary union must be brought about through coordination of
national economic policies.
Three variants of this coordination strategy can be
distinguished:
- The first approach might be called exchange-rate unification.
The idea is to gradually reduce the variability of exchange
rates between the currencies of the EC member countries by
narrowing tho margins of fluctuation and/or by restricting
the scope for parity adjustments.
- The second variant of the coordination strategy aims directly,
i.e. ex ante, and exclusively at the harrnonisation of demand
management. _ •
- Thirdly, some have considered it possible and desirable to
find a compromise between those two strategies, i.e. they
insist on simultaneous commitments with regard to both the
hannonisation of demand management and the restriction of
exchange-rate variability.
The alternative to the coordination strategy is the centrali-
sation strategy. The centralisation strategy has received
little attention so fax because centralisation has been
considered to be the probable outcome of coordination.
Centralisation has been regarded as the step that-could follow
successful coordination of national economic policies rather
than as a strategy that could make discretionary coordination
between the member governments unnecessary from the start.
As in the case of the coordination strategy, there are throe
roads to centralisation:- 2 -
- The first and most obvious approach might be called the
big-leap solution. Its adherents insist that there is no
point in taking first steps towards monetary unification
as long as centralisation of monetary policy at the
Community level is not wanted by all member governments. If,
however, by some lucky coincidence, a political constellation
developed that permitted such centralisation, the national
member currencies should be replaced by a Community currency
at once and completely. While the coordination approach caji
be compared to market collusion, aiming either at a price
cartel (exchange-rate unification) or at a quantity cartel
(harmonisation of monetary expansion) or both (simultaneous
commitments), the big-leap version of the centralisation
strategy can be viewedas uno actu monopolisation (currency
merger).
- The opposite approach, implying free competition and trade
of currencies, is the intercirculation approach to monetary
unification: all member currencies are admitted for use in
all member countries and no member currency has to be used
or even be accepted as legal tender in any one member country
unless the partners to a contract have chosen it as their
standard of value. Since only the most useful currency is
likely to survive in the long run, centralisation of monetary
policy is brought about by the market mechanism.
- Finally another compromise solution might be envisaged: the
parallel-currency approach: not all member currencies are
to compete with each other, but one currency is to compete
with all of them. Thus only a duopoly is admitted. The parall<
currency may be either one of the member currencies or a
newly created Community currency. If it is more useful than
the purely national currencies, it will gradually displace
them.
What are the criteria by which a choice between these options
can be made?— 3 —
1.2. The Economics of Economic Policy Coordination:
A Critique of the Traditional Approach
Experience with coordination of national economic policies as
envisaged by the Werner Report has been spectacularly disappoin-
ting. -
In the past, criticism of the coordination strategy has concen-
trated almost exclusively on its first variant: exchange-rate
unification. To restrict the permissible scope of exchange-rate
variations without previous harmonisation of national demand
management, it has been pointed out, is to risk one of the
following outcomes:
- If the surplus countries remain prepared to support the
agreed exchange rate by purchasing tho currencies of the
EC deficit countries in the exchange market, each member state
will be encouraged to expand the supply of its currency as
much as possible in order to maximise its national seigniorage
the government that follows the most expansionary monetary
policy will then determine the pace of inflation in the
whole Community.
- Alternatively, if the surplus countries are not prepared to
accept imported inflation and the accumulation of overvalued
foreign exchange reserves at low interest rates indefinitely,
they will either resort to restrictions of convertibility
with all their negative consequences for the international
allocation of capital and'division of labour; or, inmidst
of a speculative crisis, they may give up their resistance
to parity adjustment and thus disappoint the expectations of
investors who had based their plans on the government's
promise to maintain a fixed parity.
It can hence be demonstrated that, owing to its inflationary
and/or diaintegrative implications, exchange-rate unification
alone is likely to prove unmaintainable and/or too-costly.-
If, instead,demand management by national governments were
harmonized ex ante, no economic costs of this sort would have- k -
to be incurred. But the question remains whether such a strategy
is practicable. To coordinate economic policies governments
need operational targets. If the target is to maintain an agreed
exchange-rate vis-a-vis the other member currencies through
interventions in the foreign exchange markets, there can be no
doubt that technically it can be attained. If, however,
coordination is to take place ex ante, it is difficult oven to
determine on a theoretical basis what sort of monetary and,
possibly, budgetary policies would be necessary in order to
keep intra-Comraunity exchange rates approximately constant. _
Some observers have suggested that a simple money supply
rule should be adopted: the difference between the rate of
growth of the productive potential and the rate of growth
of the money stock should be equal in all member countries
in order to equalize their rates of inflation. To attain price
stability this difference should then gradually be reduced
to zero.
A simple money rule of this sort cannot work unless the
relevant income elasticities of demand for money are very
similar in all member countries. However, since the average
velocity of circulation differs widely between them, it is
not probable that it should be approximately the same at the
margin. Further, even if an equalisation of the inflationary
trends in the member countries could be achieved in this way,
cyclical variations in the price level will not be in tune
with each other, unless national trade cycles happen to be
synchronised. Finally, assuming that even this problem could
somehow be solved, there remains the fact that an equalisation
of the movements of national domestic price levels may not
produce exchange-rate constancy, for the purchasing power
parity doctrine will not hold unless
- there are no shifts in the terms of trade due to national
differences.in the income elasticities of import demand or
^aaioun
in productivity increases in the export sector (or, wha^
the same, no differences in productivity increases and
income elasticities of demand between a country's tradeables
and non-tradeables) , An.cS.
- currency asset preferences remain constant.• - 5 -
Alternatively, it has been suggested that nominal interest rats
be equalised in the member countries. But this proposal is
not only vulnerable to the standard objection that interest
rates are not an appropriate indicator of monetary ease or
restrictiveness, it also ignores that, if nominal interest
rates were equalised everywhere, the currencies of the
capital-scarce member countries would have to appreciate in
order to offer a higher real interest rate and thus to attract
private capital from the capital-abundant member countries.
Real interest rates, on the other hand, must also not be
equalised ex ante by governments, but as a result of private
capital arbitrage.
The matter is even more complicated when allowance is mado for
the effects of national budgetary policies. According to the
Werner Report, harmonisation of budgetary policy has to include
i) the rate of increase of the government share in GNP, ii) the
size, and changes in the size,of budget deficits or surpluses,
iii) the composition of public expenditure as well as the
level of and changes in, the rates of taxation, and iv) the
instruments of fiscal policy and budgetary concepts. However,
no indication is given as to when the effects on aggregate
demand of national budgetary policies can be regarded as
harmonised; for, obviously, a complete equalisation of all
these variables would appear unnecessary and even unreason-
able.
It therefore seems justified to conclude that economic theory
cannot provide operational long-term targets, let alone a
simple rule for the ex ante harmonisation of demand management
in a group of countries which w ish to keep the exchange
rates between their currencies approximately constant. If the
member governments want to achieve some degree of exchange-
rate stability, but, for the reasons given,"'to refrain from
large-scale interventions in foreign-exchange markets,
harmonisation will have to be not only a matter of ex ante
planning but also of almost permanent ad hoc temporising.
This has important implications.
As harmonisation becomes a day-to-day business, the number of •
agreements that have to be negotiated increases proportionately
While exchange-rate unification allows the once-and-(allegedly]- 6 -
for-all fixing of parities and of margins of fluctuation,
direct harraonisation of demand management requires an
in finite series of compromises. Given the notorious time
constraint faced by political decision makers, this is hardly
a promising approach. Moreover, there is the prospect that
clashes of national interests come into the open at every
occasion; they are widely publicised and arouse nationalist
feelings^which makes the process of coordination all the
more difficult. The harmonisation approach maximises
political friction. And since rules cannot be formulated,
no obligations exist which prevent the members from reversing
the process of coordination at will.
It is this latter weakness which the proposal for simultaneous
commitments in the field of demand management and of exchange-
rate policy is designed to remedy. The idea is to secure the
irreversibility of any progress that might be made in
harmonising national demand policies by reducing the scope
for future exchange-rate variability to the same extent. The
risks inherent in exchange-rate unification, on the other
hand, are to be avoided in that no exchange-rate commitments
are to be undertaken unless there is agreement on the
harmonisation of demand management.
The adherents of the simultaneous-commitment approach are -
trying to have the best of both worlds. As usual , however,
this means that their proposal suffers from the defects of
both approaches of which it is a compromise. To fix parities
or to reduce margins on the basis of government agreements
to harmonise demand policies is not only to assume that
ex ante harraonisation can be sufficient to warrant exchange-
rate commitments, but also that the declared will of member
governments to take the agreed measures will prevail in the
And.
domestic political arena, what is more important, since the
reduction of exchange-rate variability is to be made permanent-
ly irreversible although harmonisation can: only be secured fox
a limited period, the commitment in the exchange-rate field
has an entirely different timeAiorizon than the commitment with
regard to demand management. For all these reasons simultaneous
commitments of this sort are subject to the same types of
objection as outright exchange-rate unification. On the otherhand, if exchange-rate commitments are confined to the very
short period ahead for which harmonisation of demand manage-
ment seems to be^ secured, they can neither ensure the
irreversibility of harmonisation in"future nor avoid the
political friction produced by ad hoc coordination.
If the three variants of the coordination approach are viewed
together, their common weakness seems to be a lack of
automaticity. This is true in two respects:
- on the one hand, agreements to reduce the scope for
exchange-rate variations fail to automatically guarantee
harmonisation of demand management just as attempts <at
ex ante harmonisation fail to automatically promise
approximate exchange-rate constancy;
- on the other hand, there is no automatic mechanism inherent
in the coordination approach which makes sure that the
assimilation of national economic policies will incroa.se
over time instead of being reversed.
It is the advantage of the centralisation approach that it
can provide for such automaticity.
1.3. Centralisation; The Qase for the Parallel-Currency
Approach
To substitute a common currency for the national member
currencies is to ensure ex ante harmonisation of monetary
policy and ex ante "exchange-rate fixity" at the same time.
While exchange-rate unification between a group of equal-
sized nations is unlikely to appear irrevocable, the substi-
tution of a common currency makes monetary unification as
irreversible as any unification can be; and while exchange-
rate unification fails to eliminate all convertibility and
exchange-rate risks and the additional costs of exchange and
information which are peculiar to foreign currency trans-
actions, the substitution of a common currency creates a
currency area in which monetary barriers to trade and factor
movements have automatically ceased to exist. What remains
is the question whether centralisation of monetary policy
is sufficient for currency unification.
is Sinoa there is only one monetary policy whiqh automatically
the same for all member countries, divergencies in demand
management can only be due to fiscal policy. However,- 8 -
experience in existing federal states suggests that such
divergencies are not likely to pose a serious problem. A
strategy which relies on a centralisation of monetary policy
not accompanied by fiscal harmonisation merely implies that
fiscal policy does not serve as an instrument of Community
demand management.
There remains the problem of divergencies in the real sphere.
If, for example, productivity- increases at different rates
in the various member countries, exchange-rate adjustments
can serve a useful purpose. They cannot, it is true, prevent
the movement of factors of production to the countries where
they enjoy a higher productivity, but a depreciation of
currencies of countries in which productivity grows less can
help to reduce increases in their real wage level and thus
to reduce their level of unemployment. If wage subsidies are
to be an instrument of regional policy, the loss of exchange-
rate policy could be compensated by the establishment of a
regional policy at Community level.
currency unification facilitates the movement of
private capital to the backward regions and countries, it
does not imply a regional policyl Thus the automaticity which
it affords does not extend to regional policy. But the same
is true for a coordination strategy which confines itself
to exchange-rate policy and/or demand management. Moreover,
as has been explained, exchange-rate unification is likely
to lead to interference with the movement of private capital
to the depressed regions.
The big-leap approach has all the advantages of the centrali-
sation strategy but the disadvantage that it lacks gradualism.
The case for gradualism is both political and economic. From
a political point of view, to transfer all monetary compe-
tences from national to Community institutions at one stroke
is to maximise the provocation to, and hence the resistance
from, the forces of nationalism and conservatism. For just
as exchange-rate illusion persists the longer, the moregradual exchange-rate changes are» so the illusion of
national monetary sovereignty can "be maintained the better,
the more gradual the transfer of competences. The more
abrupt the strategy is, the less likely it is therefore to
ever be executed. Moreover, if the Community confined her-
self to waiting for the day X on which a favourable political
constellation may permit the big leap forward, H would
fail to defend and exploit the - however weak - political
impetus for, and commitment to, the goal of monetary unifi-
cation which have survived the failures of the early seventies.
From an economic point of view, gradualism has the advantage
of facilitating adjustment to the future: a gradual evolution
can be anticipated more easily so that misallocation due to
disappointed expectations can be minimised. No doubt, it
is also for this reason that the EC customs union was not
established at once, but that tariff reductions were spread
over many years. Finally, gradualism offers the economic
benefit that some advantages of monetary union can already be
enjoyed at a very early stage.
The intercirculation approach observes the principles of both
gradualism and automaticity. In a field like money in which
economies of scale are of overriding importance, competition
tends to produce a "natural monopoly" in a gradual process.
The currency that is most useful to private economic agents
outcompetes the others; it will spread first in those
transactions for which a common European currency is most
needed. Moreover, currency competition by itself is likely
to reduce the seigniorage profits which the institutions
issuing money can earn and which prevent money from being
held in optimal quantities; thus the intercirculation approach
is no doubt optimal from a microeconomic point of view. From
a political point of view, however, this road to currency
union may appear most objectionable. Instead of fostering- 10 -
a feeling of European solidarity, It introduces an element
of national rivalry. This is also the case, though to a
lesser extent, if one national member currency is made a
parallel currency in all member countries.
It is for this reason that the creation of a new European
Parallel Currency (EPC) has been suggested. For in this way
rivalry between national interests would be avoided; what
would remain is the inevitable conflict between the national
and the Community level, but this would be resolved through
the market mechanism ratherthan political log-rolling.
Furthermore, in the present circumstances, the parallel-
currency approach is superior to the intercirculation approach
in that it permits^To "combine the objective of currency
unification with the objective of currency reform. It is
easier to create a new currency that is better than the old
currencies than to stabilise the value of the old currencies.
To reduce a given rate of inflation is to risk temporary
unemployment because inflationary expectations are slow
to adjust and hence real wages and the real rate of interest
on fixed-interest liabilities rise above their full-employment
equilibrium level.
1tk. Non-Competitive Conceptions,of the Parallel Currency
Approach
Not all advocates of a European Parallel Currency suggest
that it should drive out the national member currencies. Two
such non-competitive 'Conceptions may be distinguished.
- The first is to use the parallel currency merely as a pivot
for European exchange-rate unification. The idea is there-
fore not to gradually displace the national member
currencies but to facilitate the gradual reduction of
exchange-rate variability between them.- 11 -
- The other non-competitive conception of the parallel-currency
approach avoids this problem because it Is more modest in
scope: the creation of the EPC is considered not as means
to monetary unification but as an end in itself. The bene-
fits to be had from its creation are the benefits of re-
placing the Eurodollar (and the other non-EC eurocurrencies)
in Intra-Community, and perhaps even in external trans-
actions .
A currency substitution that is confined to non-EC euro-
currencies has great political appeal for the member govern-
ments because for them it implies not a sacrifice, but a
gain of monetary power. But it would bo a purely distributive
gain at the expense of non-members: world economic efficiency
would not be increased. Since one currency would be added
without other currencies being eliminated even in the long
run, it is, on the contrary, probable that global transaction ''
costs would grow. Moreover, unless, for some other reason,
the EPC were more attractive than non-EC currencies, EC private
agents would have to be forced to dispense with the currencies
which, according to their revealed preference, serve their
purpose best.
Apart from these welfare aspects, there are sex
iious"problems.
If the holding or intra-Community use of, say, Eurodollars
were prohibited to EC residents, they might still prefer to
move into a national EC currency rather than into the EPC.
Some observers have even predicted that, anyway, one of the
national EC currencies is likely to replace the dollar on
eurocurrency markets in the near future. In either case,
even the creation of a "non-domestic" EPC would be bound to
clash with the national interest of one member country. The
same would be true if the EPC were more attractive than the
dollar. Effective controls would be needed to prevent it
from displacing most national member currencies, both in the
eurocurrency market and at home. .- 12 -
2. What sort of European Parallel Currency?
2.1. An attractive EPC
2.1.1. Attraction versus Coercion
The simplest way to ensure the acceptance of the EPC is to
oblige the users of money to accept it. However, if both the
EPC and the respective currency were declared legal or even
compulsory tender, the exchange rate between them would have
to.be fixed; for unless it is stipulated at which rate the
EPC has to be accepted (cours legal) or used (cours force),
the objection to accept or use it has little meaning in
practice. If the exchange rates between the EPC and each
national member currency had to be fixed, obviously, the exchange
rates between all member currencies would be fixed. In that
case, however, the creation of a parallel currency would not
substitute^ but presuppose, exchange-rate unification;
it would lose its raison d'etre.
This paradox could be avoided if the EPC were prescribed or
made legal tender for only some transactions while the
national currencies could still be used and might remain
legal tender for all other purposes.
Such a procedure would be practicable, but not unobjectionable.
For the reasons juat given, prohibition and coercion are :
likely to reduce the efficiency of monetary transactions and
calculations. This is the more probable if the law discrimi-
nates between types of transactions and thus introduces
distortions into the pattern of monetary transactions which
run counter to the comparative advantages of the competing
currencies.
2.1.2. The Economic Case for "Subsidising" a New Currency
As has been indicated already, the use of money is subject
to very sizeable individual and social economies of scale,
which act as a barrier to entry for any new currency. From
the individual's point of view information cost is the smaller,
the fewer standards of value are used; since not only accounts,Bibliothekdes Institute'
"
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contracts etc., but also money as a store of value and as a
means of payment are denominated in a standard of value, the
individual's information costs are smallest if the same
currency serves him as a standard of value, a store of value
and a means of payment. Second, the use of only one standard
of value protects the individual against exchange-rate risk
or the cost of hedging against it, ^«nhe uses more than one
standard of value. Thirdly, the individual can save costs of
exchange and/or of portfolio management ^i.e. of information,
of hedging and/or exchange risk) by using only one means of
payment.
While the information costs described are the higher, the more
standards of value are added, but are independent of the
number of accounts or contracts denominated in these additional
standards of value, the costs of exchange and probably also
exchange risk and the cost of hedging and portfolio manage-
ment are related to the number of transactions in which the
parallel standard is used, i.e. they are not fixed but
variable costs. Provided that extreme elasticity assumptions
are excluded, these costs are explicitTyvT56"rnV by both parties
to a contract - they give rise to social economies of scale.
The "defection" of an individual from currency domain A to
currency domain B implies a redistribution of income from the
residents of A to the residents of B, i.e. it creates distri-
butional (or in a different terminology, "pecuniary") externalities
To the extent that it affects the choice of currency by others
and consequently the pattern of transactions between them, it
will also have secondary external effects. In all these
respects, the choice between currencies is comparable to the
choice between languages or telephone networks or industrial
locations. It is the 'reverse of the choice between different
roads by car drivers where entry implies congestion and thus
diseconomies of scale.
The existence of external economies of scale is the basis
1of
the "infant-currency argument" for the subsidisation of a new
money. Just as production in locations which offer no linkages
with complementary industries is subsidised in the framework
of regional policy so as to compensate for the lack of. - 14 -
locational economies of scale, so the EPC may be subsidised
to compensate for its lack of (social) transaction economies
of scale. However, unless there are specific distributional
objectives to be attained, subsidisation cannot be justified
on grounds of purely distributional externalities. Only if,
as will have to be shown, the EPC is more desirable from a
social welfare point of view, i.e. if Us use gives rise to
real-income (in a different terminology, "technological")
externalities that raise micro- or macromoriotary efficiency,
ought there to be discrimination in its favour.
As a matter of fact, EPC subsidisation would even be justified
on these grounds when the EPC is no longer an infant but the
most important currency in the Community. The reason is not
that at this stage the analogy with an Infant industry breaks
down but that, strictly speaking, the argument which justifies
infant-industry subsidisation is equally applicable to
"adult" industries. For to speak of an infant-industry
argument is not to argue that "grown-up" industries which
prod\a<B external real-income economies must not be subsidised,
but that they will probably able to survive without sub-
sidies. In short, subsidisation will still be justified, but
it will no longer be necessary.
EPC subsidisation will no longer be necessary when its
transaction domain has attained the size of the largest
national EC currency domain(s), provided that at this point
the national currencies will also have lost their privilege
of legal tender. If no party to a contract can dictate to
the other the currency inVaebt is denominated and settled
and if both currencies enjoy equal economies of scale,
competition will show whether a currency that may be used
all over the Community is more useful than a national
currency which cannot be used in transactions '.
within other member countries.
2.1.3. EPC privileges for Specific Uses
In accordance with this analysis, some authors have suggested
solutions which amount to privileges for specific EPC uses.- 15 -
If the EPC is prevented from appreciating so as to compensate
for these incentives, such measures are likely to be
effective. But they have disadvantages. Since they favour
some EPC uses more than others, they distort the pattern
of transaction costs; for this reason, a uniform subsidy
would be preferable. Moreover, most of these privileges serve
no other purpose than to compensate for the EPC's lack of
economies of scale; they are not desirable in themselves.
(Those, on the other hand, which, like the lifting of capital
controls, are of intrinsic usefulness could - just for this
reason - also be usefully extended to the national member
currencies.) In both respects, EPC privileges for specific
uses are inferior to an EPC value guarantee.
'2.1.4. Value-Maintenance Provisions
2.1.4.1. The Options
For the EPC several types of possible value guarantees can
be imagined.
The simplest conception is to fix its value in terms of
another currency or monetary asset, for example, in terms of
the US dollar, some other non«EC or national EC currency or
the SDR.
A second method would be to relate the EPC's value to the
value of the group of national EC currencies:
- The EPC could be defined as the sum of fixed amounts of
national EC currencies ("fixed-amount basket" or "EURCO
formula"); the number of units of each currency in the
basket would be calculated so as to give each country's
currency a weight corresponding to its share in European
trade, GNP, and/or other criteria.
- The EPC could be defined as a basket of variable amounts
of national currencies which are adjusted so as to maintain
initial weights ("fixed-weight basket" or "par-valuation").
It presupposes that there is an internal or
external reference currency or some rule by which ©»v.e can
determine whether a given exchange-rate adjustment- 16 -
between the national EC currencies is to be interpreted as
a revaluation of the appreciating member currencies or as
a devaluation of the depreciating member currencies.
The two basket formulae just described could be used
discriminatingly according to whether parities are
adjusted upwards or downwards ("asymmetrical basket"):
devaluations of national EC currencies could be accompanied
by increases in the number of units in the bag, while
revaluations would leave the number of currency units in
the bag unchanged. If the parity of one or several national
EC currencies were adjusted vis-a-vis the others, the EPC•s
value in terms of these other currencies could rise but
not fall. Since in the case of devaluations the asymmetri-
cal basket is equivalent to the fixed-weight basket, it
requires - like the latter - the choice of a reference
currency or a reference-currency rule.
If the EPC were made a European pivot currency representing
the median of the snake • and/or of a gliding parity
schedule, this would imply an at least short-term link of
the member currencies to the EPC and hence Indirectly a
sort of value guarantee for the EPC. The margins of
fluctuation and/or of exchange-rate gliding can be applied
either to an EPC defined by the EURCO formula or according
to the par-value approach. In both cases, "central rates"
between the national member currencies and the EPC would
have to be declared to which the margins could be applied.
But while an EPC pivot defined according to the par-value
approach would merely be the median of permissible exchange-
rate variations, an EPC pivot defined by the EURCO formula
would in addition represent the weighted average of the
effective values of national member currencies. If the
EPC were defined according to par valuation, permitted
margins between it and the national member currencies would
be half as large as the implied margins between each pair
of national member currencies; if the EPC were defined
b
v the EURCO formula, this would only hold if both of the
national member currencies concerned had equal weights in- 17 -
the basket and if no other intra-EC exchange-rate changes
occua-ed that changed the average of the basket.
The third method would be to adopt a rule for changes in the
EPC's value vis-a-vis one currency or the group of national
member currencies:
- The EPC could be made to offer an EC currency option, i.e.
it would be as good as the "strongest" member currency. In
that case it would, in principle, be equivalent to the
European Currency Unit (ECU), various versions of which
have been used on the Eurobond market. However, there is
one important difference between a currency option for a
bond and a currency option for a currency. A bond is issued
at one point in time and for a predefined term. To increase
the attractiveness of this bond the issuer merely need,? to
denominate it in a unit of account that keeps the value
of the currency which appreciates most over the whole term
of the bond. A currency is Issued continuously and, hence,
has to be kept attractive continuously. If, in these
circumstances, the member currency that has appreciated
most in the past were expected to depreciate for sometime
in the future, the EPC would be temporarily as unattractive
as this member currency regardless "whether its depreciation
were expected to be more or less than its appreciation in
the past. Thus, from time to time, there would be speculative
shifts out of the EPC whenever the hitherto strongest member
currency were expected to depreciate. These shifts could be
kept the smaller, the more frequently the guaranteed con-
version rates between the EPC and the national member
currencies which underlie the currency option were adjusted
to prevailing market exchange rates. In that case, however,,
the EPC would probably be far "stronger" than the "strongest"
member currency.
- Rather than offering a direct value guarantee, the EPC Bank
could stipulate in advance that the EPC money supply would
increase at a more modest rate than the money supply of
any member currency.- 18 -
- The EPC's value could be kept stable in terms of weighted
EC purchasing power. Most conveniently, the EPC would be
defined as a basket of weighted amounts of the national
member currencies that would each be increased whenever,
and by the same percentage by which,the cost-of-living
index rose in the respective member country (indexed
basket).
" The EPC could be defined as a basket of weighted amounts
of th© national member currencies that would each be
increased by the rate of interest on investments of
similarly low risk and high liquidity, deductions being
made for the cost of producing and policing the EPC
(no-seigniorage basket). • "
This list of optional value-maintenance provisions is not
exhaustive. It contains only the most promising suggestions
that have been made. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that
any parity guarantee may be combined with any guarantee as
to the margins of fluctuations and that an internal value
guarantee may be combined with an external value guarantee,
provided member governments are willing to bind themselves
in this way. For example, the EPC may at the same time use
the SDR (defined as an international basket of currencies)
as a pivot and itself serve as a EURCO-type pivot for the
EC member currencies. In this case exchange-rate variations
between the currencies in the SDR basket might oblige the
EC member countries to intervene in the exchange markets so
as to keep their currencies within the agreed margins around
the basket of fixed amounts of EC member currencies as which
the EURCO-type EPC would be defined.- 19 -
2.1.4.2. Characteristics of an Optimal EC Standard of Value
A standard of value is the more useful both from an individual
and from a social point of view, the more it reduces infor-
mation cost and risk. While information cost matters most
for accounting, risk is the main criterion by which the use-
fulness of a contract unit will be judged. In both respects
a standard of value is the more desirable, the more stable and
p re djLc t ab 1 e j
Vits value in terms of both fluctuations and permanent
changes.
While information cost is affected only by the frequency
of value variations, risk depends only on their size.
2.1.4.2.1. Minimising the Cost of Infonaation about gxchange-
i?ate Changes
Exchange-rate adjustment between the national EC currencies
vlowe&i/
would imply tlieVinfonnation' cost for EPC users if the EPC
were defined on the par-valuation approach with zero margins j
of fluctuation. This is because, for example, tho revaluation j
of one member currency would then be accompanied by a
proportionate reduction of the number of units of this currency
contained in the fixed-weight basket and would hence not
affect the exchange rates between the EPC and the other
member currencies. Information cost would be the highest if the
EPC offered no direct value guarantee but only a money-supply
guarantee, so that shifts in demand would affect
its value and hence exchange-rates (scarce-money rule). It
would also be high if the revaluation of one member currency
affected exchange rates between the EPC and all member
currencies as would notably be the case if the EPC were defined
on the EURCO formula, as an indexed basket, a no-seigniorage
basket or in terras of the SDR, and the frequency of such
exchange-rate changes would tend to be the higher, the more
currencies in th© basket. Somewhere in the middle lie a- 20 -
number of solutions which combine two of these extreme
solutions (e.g. the asymmetrical basket) or which imply a
permanent or conditional link to one currency (e.g. a link
to the dollar, an EC currency option, indexation on one
national currency) and hence have different consequences for
Information cost depending on the currency which is revalued,
Vhile- it is clear that a par-valuation approach for fhe
EPC minimises information costs when the exchange rate of one
member currency changes, this conclusion need not hold when
several currencies are involved. Assume that the majority of
member currencies is revalued vis-a-vis the rest. According to the
simple par-valuation approach which has been described the
EPC would devalue vis-a-vis the majority of member currencies,
but would maintain its exchange rate vis-a-vis the remaining
minority. This is because simple par-valuation links the EPC
to the currencies of those member countries whose exchange-rate
"policy" is of a purely passive nature. Since such a link
is entirely arbitrary from an economic point of view, the
simple par-valuation approach might be complemented by a
majority rule so that the minimisation of information costs
continues to be' ensured. The information costs that have to
be borne by EPC users whenever the parities of member currencie
are adjusted are the higher, the greater the number of EPC
,af f ectedy
users*; to "minimise the total information costs of parity
changes it would thus be necessary to use the number of EPC
users in each member country as weights in determining whether
a majority or a minority has changed its parity.
Alternatively, if this is too cumbersome, member currencies
may be weighted according to the number of prospective EPC
users resident in the respective member country, say,
according to the country's share in intra-Community trade
and capital transactions. The adoption of some sort of
majority rule would also prevent the par-valuation
approach fron becoming inoperable when all member countries
abandoned their parities and started floating; the EPC•s- 21 -
value would be linked to the member currency with-the largest
weight.
While majority par-valuation would minimise the cost of infor-
mation about exchange-rate changes between the national member
currencies and the EPC, it would fail to distribute it in
equal proportions between the member countries. Since the
nature and sequence of future exchange-rate changes cannot
be predicted with sufficient certainty, this bias in favour
of the Community majority cannot be compensated by a corre-
sponding ex ante bias in favour of the Community minority
when contract prices are fixed. Nevertheless, this bias could
be justified if (at least) the majority of member governments
agreed and actually managed to harmonise their demand policies
so as to ensure exchange-rate constancy between their national
currencies. It would serve as an incentive to aim at the
majority rate of inflation. Thus the par-valuation approach
is a typically Wernerian conception. However, if the majority
missed the coordination target by the same degree or if no
obligatory coordination targets existed at all (as Is presently
the case), majority par-valuation and hence the minimisation
of information cost would be incompatible with distributional
justice. In these cases it would be the fairest solution if
the EPC's value were linked to the member ourrency which came
nearest to the objective of price stability.
Although the minimisation and a fair distribution of the
information costs involved in EPC exchange-rate adjustments
vis-a-vis the national member currencies may require different
solutions, the dilemma that arises does not seem serious. The
reason is that the cost of calculating and communicating the
new EPC exchange rates can be considered neglig A ble^ however
complicated the formula used to define the EPC's value may be
and however often exchange rates may change. For those who
find this calculation too costly, the Statistical Office of
the EC Commission could publicise the exchange rates between
the EPC and the member currencies on a daily or even hourly
basis.- 22 -
2.1.4.2.2. Hedging against the Risk of Exchange-Rate Changes
More Important than the information cost of using the addi-
tional currency as a standard of value are the risks involved,
A risk-averse EC resident who faces, for example, a net
obligation (liabilities and expenditure) denominated in his
national currency will prefer claims (assets and income)
denominated in the same currency to claims denominated in
another currency or unit like the EPC. And he will wish to
hedge in a corresponding way if he disposes of net assets
denominated in his national currency. While exchange risk is
a barrier to the use of any new standard of value in domestic
(the ca.se;
transactions, this need not be 'V for contracts between the
residents of different currency domains in which exchange
risk is impossible to avoid unless foreign currency claims
are matched with foreign currency obligations and vice versa.
If the partners to an international contract want to spare
CPJ?-OK*Z&s? ivol_y/
the cost of such hedging and if they face the samerimTrelTsThg
disutility as risk increases (progressive risk aversion), the
total cost of the risk is minimised when it is shared by them
in equal parts. Thus risk, unlike information cost, tends to
be minimised and distributed fairly by the same standard of
value.
The analysis so far suggests that for bilateral international
contracts (which are the usual case) the ideal standard of
value is a basket containing only the two national currencies
concerned at equal weights. But the implication of this
solution would be that there ought to be as many (bilateral)
standards of value as there are pairs of currencies
(i.e.2 /n_2\i)»
 e-S' 36 in intra-EC relations (n = 9). The
number of standards involved indicates that a system of
purely bilateral baskets would suffer from considerable dis-
economies of small scale. This is particularly relevant to
the Eurobond market where substantial costs can be saved by
offering one bond issue to a number of different nationals.- 23 -
Thus, from the point of view of exchange risk and scale econo-
mies combined, a EURCO-type EPC which takes part of the risk
from everybody and which is weighted according to the share
of each member country in international intra-Community trans-
actions (as an approximation to the risk suffered by its
residents) should not only be attractive and useful for multi-
lateral institutions like the EC Commission and for multi-
national companies-and others having net claims/obligations
In a multitude of EC member currencies, but for bilateral
contracts as well.
This comes out particularly clearly if the EURCO-type formula
is compared with majority par-valuation. For example,
there may be a series of independent devaluations of all
national member currencies except one; or in a system of
general floating the member currency with the greatest weight
may appreciate vis-a-vis the rest. In both cases an EPC
defined according to majority par-valuation would follow the
strongest currency and, hence, get out of line with the
others. It would not only fail to guarantee an approximately
even distribution of exchange risk for the users of the
weaker currencies, it would actually imply a greater exchange
risk than their national currencies. A EURCO-type EPC, oxx
the other hand, would undergo the weighted average rate of
depreciation of the member currencies and thus be much less
likely to depreciate either more or loss than both of any two
national member currencies.
But apart from this risk, economies of scale and the distri-
bution of information cost there is a further aspeot that
strongly points in favour of using some sort of multi-
currenoy basket as an EC standard of value.- 24 -
2.1.4.2.3* Currency Diversification: Reducing the Risk of
Fluctuations in the Rate of Inflation and of
Real Exchange-Rate Changes
An individual who does not have substantial net obligations
or claims denominated in his national currency and who there-
fore does not have to fear the use of more than one standard,
will seek for a standard of value that protects him against
fluctuations in the rate of inflation and in real exchange
rates to which monetary standards tend to be subject. One
way of aiming at protection of this sort is to create larger
currency areas, another to emptoy a multicurrency standard, i.e.
to reduce the fluctuation in rates of inflation and real
exchange rates by averaging them. The optimal standard on this
account would be a basket of fixed amounts of all existing
currencies; for the greater diversification, the more likely
is the law of large numbers to produce some degree of stability
in the basket rate of loss of purchasing power.
However, this reasoning is based on two somewhat restrictive
assumptions. First of all, it supposes that there are no
specific expectations as to the rates of inflation and real
exchange-rate changes of individual currencies. This assumption
need not hold. For example, it might be expected that on the
average non-EC countries tend to experience wider fluctuations
in their rates of inflation and their terms of trade than the
member countries. In this case it would be rational to include
mainly or only Community currencies in. the basket. Second,
this conclusion is based on the assumption that all real
exchange rates are equally relevant for the residents of the
EC member countries. This assumption is unrealistic .The risk
of real exchange-rate changes will be the less for an EC
resident, the more closely the composition-of the basket
standard of value conforms to the pattern of his foreign trade
and capital transactions. For the Community as a whole this
means that the EPC basket should contain mainly national- 25 -
EC currencies and that these should be weighted according to
the respective member, country's share in the Community's
internal and external foreign trade and capital transactions.
Allowing for these two aspects; a standard of value, defined
as a basket of member currencies only, may not be as far from
the optimum as it might seem at first.
To the extent that EC residents try to reduce risk through
diversification they are interested in an averaging device
that is entirely automatic and unbiased. For only in this case
will the law of large numbers work. This means that in
particular any basket whose composition is arbitrary or may
be altered at the discretion of governments fails to reduce
the risk of random currency fluctuations by as- much as a
predictable automatic formula could do.
2.1.4.2.4. Eliminating the Risk of Inflation and of Nominal
Exchange-Rate Changes and Reducing the Risk of
Real Exchange-Rate Changes: The Indexed Basket
When a standard of value that loses purchasing power at a more
stable rate than its competitors is more attractive than they
a standard of value that conserves its purchasing power must
be even more attractive. The indexed basket is such a standard
of value. From the point of view of protection against
inflation it is more useful than a EURCO-type basket in two
respects: it reduces the inflation risk by guaranteeing not
only a more stable but a constant rate of inflation, and it
reduces the cost of information about the purchasing power
to which it is equivalent by guaranteeing that this constant
rate of inflation will be zero. Thus it eliminates all risks
of inflation and, by definition, of purely nominal exchange-
rate changes. While the EURCO-formula is only a device
distributing the total risk of nominal and real exchange-
rate changes in such a way that its total disutility is
.its users.
minimised, the indexed basket permits
1'to reduce the total
risk by confining it to real exchange-rate changes and to
distribute this remaining risk in the same way as the EURCO-
formula does. This can be shown as follows.- 26 -
If exchange-rate changes merely compensated for differences
in national rates of inflation, the purchasing power of the
amounts of each member currency in the indexed basket would
remain constant, either because there would be no inflation
in the member country concerned or because the number of
units of its currency in the basket would.be increased by
the country's rate of inflation. In these circumstances,
an EC resident who had his income denominated in an
inde-xed-basket EPC and spent it exactly on the representative
basket of commodities to which the indexed basket amounts
(see p.2.3) would dispose of the same purchasing power regard-
less of the country in which he earned his income, in which
currency he denominated his purchase contracts and which rate
of inflation prevailed for his national currency. On the
other hand, if for instance the terras of trade of one member
country improve^ vis-a-vis the others, its currency would
appreciate vis-a-vis the others even if the rates of inflation
were the same in all member countries, and the purchasing
power of the amounts in the basket of this currency would
actually increase if they were used for expenditure in the
countries whose terms of trade had deteriorated. Thus an
EC resident whose income were denominated in EPC would lose
purchasing power to the extent that he spent more of it in
the gaining country than its currency had weight in the basket,
or he would gain to the extent that he spent more of it in
the other (losing) countries than their currencies had weight
in the basket. More generally speaking, the weights which
each member currency obtained in the basket would determine to
which extent the basket's constant purchasing power would be
defined in terms of which country's commodities and hence
how the remaining real exchange risk is distributed.
There is one type of risk which the indexed basket fails to
eliminate or to reduce: the risk inherent in the use of more
than one standard of value. Indeed, if inflation continued
in the countries of the Community as may be expected, the- 27 -
indexed-basket EPC would be likely to appreciate in the long
run even vis-a-vis the "strongest" national member currency,
i.e. it would get entirely out of touch with the national
currencies. However, as has been explained in Section
2.1.4.2.2., the risk of using more than one standard of value
does not matter unless there are net claims or net obligations
denominated in the national member currencies against which
the individuals concerned wish to hedge. Since such contracts
will expire sometime in the future, this risk will only
be'felt during a transitional phase. In the new contracts
to be concluded, ultimate consumers will be attracted by the
indexed standard of value which protects their income and
savings against loss of purchasing power, and producers will
be eager to denominate all contractually fixed payments to
factors of production (wages, interest) in a standard of value
which ensures that the nominal amounts of their payments will
be affected by changes in the price level in just the same
way as the receipts they obtain from their sales. Moreover,
multinational EC companies may wish to use the indexed
standard of value as a unit of account in profit and loss
accounting because it permits them to value capital goods
and inventory more nearly at their replacement costs rather
than at their historical cost and thereby to avoid the
calculation of illusory profits.
The indexed basket would be a particularly useful unit of
account for the EC Commission and the other Community
institutions: at last budget contributions, development aid,
regional aid, direct agricultural subsidies, duties, taxes,
fines etc. could all be fixed in real terms. It could also
conveniently be used by the European Fund for Monetary
Cooperation to denominate credits to member central banks
and by the European Investment Bank to denominate its
borrowing and lending, as well as by the Coal and Steel
Community, the Statistical Office of the Commission, the
European Court of Justice and in treaties with non-member
countries. If the present system of agricultural price support- 28 -
deserved to be continued, it would even be logical to fix
support prices in real terms as some farmer associations
have demanded. Surprising though it may be, the dozen or so
different units of account that are presently employed by
the Community could all be usefully replaced by the indexed
basket. Depending on the purpose of the unit, it would still
be possible to differentiate as to the frequency of recal-
culating the unit's national currency equivalents. I/here
daily adjustments of conversion rates create administrative
difficulties, longer adjustment periods or adjustment thresk-
olds could be defined. Infact, this is already current
practice with the existing units of account and probably
inevitable as long as exchange-rate fluctuations persist. It
is also conceivable that different currency weights would
be used for different purposes, according to the currency
pattern ' of contributions and of expenditure in the case
of the budget, the regional fund and the Coal and Steel
Community, and according to the pattern of contributions only
in the case of the Development Fund, the European Investment
Bank and the European Fund for Monetary Cooperation. Whether
uniformity or diversity of weights is more efficient depends
on the relative importance of information, costs as compared
with the risk of real exchange-rate changes.
As a private unit of contract and account.the indexed-basket
standard of value would have to compete with index clauses
confined to the national cost-of-living index or even more
specific provisions where such clauses are permitted. But if
the private sector needs some sort of an EC standard of value
at all, it should be most interested in a standard like the
indexed basket, which reduces not only the risk of real
exchange-rate changes, but also eliminates the inflation risk.
Were it not for inertia, the transitional desire to hedge
open positions in the existing currencies and notably the
high diseconomies of small scale in information cost that act
as a barrier to the, use of a new standard of value the market- 29 -
would have already been using the indexed-basket standard'years
Since it has not, the Community institutions may have to lend
it a helping hand by adopting it as their unit of account.
2.1.4.2.5* Maintainability of Value Guarantees
A standard of value is the more useful, the longer it promises
to be applicable. In the case of the EPC, there are tvo reasons
why the value guarantee to which it is subject may not be
maintainable indefinitely.
The first problem is that all value guarantees using basket
formulae(except for the parevaluation approach) may gradually
lose their relevance as exchange-rate changes alter the real
weights of the member currencies in the basket. This danger
is most serious with a EURCO-type formula whose weights
will be affected by both, real and nominal exchange-rate changes.
The weights of the indexed basket, on the other hand, are only
altered by real exchange-rate changes, i.e. those which do
not compensate for divergencies between national inflation rates
However, it is not difficult to readjust weights from time
to time, either a.t regular intervals or whenever the departure
from initial weights or from current shares in intra-Cornmunity
trade and capital transactions has reached a certain predefined
size.Once the EPC has prevailed in international intra-Community
transactions weights may also be oriented more towards
the share which each member country has in Community'GUP so that
the EPC's usefulness for domestic national transactions is
increased. Weights can be adjusted while the external value of
the EPC,say, in terms of the SDR, remains constant; the adjust-
ments will entail minor changes in exchange rates between the
EPC and the national member currencies, but not among the
national member currencies themselves.
If one of the national member currencies were driven out of
circulation and were not reissued, it would, of course, drop
out of the basket; to maintain the EPC's value the share of this
currency would have to be taken up by the remaining member
currencies in proportion to their weight in the basket torso.- 30 -
Secondly, the question arises whether the value guarantee can
be maintained where and when the EPC is the only circulating
currency.
With regard to the transitional phase when some national member
currencies still exist in some parts of the Community, this
question must , no doubt, be answered in the'affirmative. If
the issuing institution ("EPC Bank") intervened vis-a-vis the
national member currencies, so as to keep constant the EPC's weighted
purchasing power (which it could do with absolute
precision), it would make sure that the same amount of EPC,v
if exchanged for the basket of national member currencies,,
would buy the same standard basket of commodities• Moreover,
to the extent that identical commodities were priced iden-
tically (at prevailing exchange rates), in all parts of the
Community, these interventions would guarantee that the price ;
of the standard basket of commodities would be stable (in •;
terms of EPC) also in those regions in which the EPC were >
already the only circulating currency.
When the final stage is reached and the national currencies
 ;
are no longer in circulation anywhere, the EPC's value can no longer'
be guaranteed through more currency interventionsf
unless it is linked to some external currency, monetary asset, ;
price index or interest rate.' However, the
indexed basket may be maintained as a mere standard of value;
in this case, liabilities denominated in EPC would be subject to
an EC index clause and thus keep their value in terms
of the weighted basket of commodities as which the indexed
currency basket was defined when the EPC was still a parallel
currency.. - 31 -
2.1 A.J>. Characteristics of an Optimal EC Slore of Value
While in the case of a standard of value the same solution, namely the
indexed basket of EC currencies, appears both most attractive for indi-
vidual users and optimal from the point of view of microeconomic efficiency
and macroeconomic policy, this assumption is not Justified when money is
considered in its function as a store of value.
2.1'A".J>. 1. Attractiveness to Individual Users
The attractiveness of a standard of value must be evaluated in terms of
information cost and various risks; the attractiveness of a store of value
depends in addition on the yield it offers. Since no interest tends to be
paid on money (cash and demand deposits), the currency that, appreciates
most vis-a-vis the others offers the highest yield. Given that the real .
interest rate is positive, that all national EC currencies continue to
lose purchasing power and that the strongest national member currency does
not appreciate vis-a-vis the weighted EC average by more than the weighted
EC average rate of inflation, the EPC value guarantee which, in terms of
yield, is most attractive among the options that have been listed is the no-
seigniorage basket, followed by the indexed basket and, thirdly, the EC
currency option.
2.1.4.3'.2. Micro-monetary Efficiency
Money on which no seigniorage is exacted scores higher in terms of micro-
economic efficiency of money holding than (non-interest bearing) money of
stable purchasing power or the strongest but inflating national currency.
As the theory of the optimum quantity of money indicates, the existence of
seigniorage, i.e. of monopoly profits from the production of money, amounts
to an excess of private costs over social costs of holding money; as a
result of this discrepancy, private users will economise on money holdings
excessively. If the payment of interest on currency in circulation is not
feasible, seigniorage can only be completely eliminated v/hen the price
level keeps falling. When no interest is paid, the optimum quantity of
EPC would be the quantity that reduces the price level (as measured in EPC)
by the rate of interest paid on investments which are comparable to money.
However, the assumption that price stability implies seigniorage on
currency in circulation may not hold. In the first place, coins and notes
are not as cheap to produce and police as bank.money. Further, the use of- 32 -
currency for payments leads to its physical deterioration and hence gives
rise to replacement costs; while in the case of bank money, this social
cost of payments can be separated from the social cost of providing money
to hold, this is impossible in the case of currency. For both reasons,
currency should be made less attractive than bank money. Finally,.to reduce
the price level by the rate of interest is to incur considerable adjustment
costs for the economy as a whole; these social costs may in fact exceed
the. social benefit of paying interest on currency, Just as the transaction
cost of paying interest on some types of bank deposits may exceed interest
itself.
For these reasons, the theory of the optimum quantity of money is not
entirely conclusive. It may well be that, from the point of view of micro-
economic efficiency, an EPC of constant purchasing power is also an optimal
s-iore of value provided the EPC Bank pays interest on commercial banks'
reserve deposits and, possibly, on their reported average cash holdings^
and provided the EC Commission enforces competition in the banking industry
to prevent commercial banks from earning seigniorage on money deposited with
them. Since seigniorage is a monopoly profit from the production of money,
its elimination is, strictly speaking, not even a subsidy of EPC holders
(or , even worse, a weapon to establish a monopoly through price war), but
a pure benefit of restoring competition. It might even pay a pr.'<W? bank
to denominate demand deposits (and loans) in the indexed basket using
existing high-powered money from national sources as their monetary base.
Total EC money supply would not be affected, but its composition by de-
nomination would change.
2.1.4.).). Implications for the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy
The choice of an EPC value guarantee v/ill affect the effectiveness of
national monetary policies in two ways.
In the first place, the existence of an indexed EPC (and of EPC-
iadexed bonds etc.) would reduce the wide proliferation of money substitutes
which have been introduced owing, in large part, to the loss of purchasing
power of money. Since these substitutes are more difficult to regulate than
national (and EPC) money supply, an EPC that would promise constant EC
purchasing power would enhance the effectiveness of national monetary and
financial policies.- 33 -
Secondly, the less seigniorage is earned on the EPC^the smaller the
variations will be in the interest-rate differential between (the largely
non-interest-bearing) money and interest-bearing money substitutes and
hence the irritating shifts between them which changes in monetary policy
may call forth. A dear money policy, for example, would be less likely to
be thwarted by unpredictable changes in the velocity of circulation and
the effective bank multiplier.
• "Thus an indexed-basket solution and a no-seigniorage solution (whatever
the latter may imply) for the EPC would be likely to increase the effective-
ness of monetary policy.
2.1.4.4. Characteristics of an Optimal EC Means of Payment
Value guarantees affect the attractiveness of a means of payment not only
because a means of payment is also always at least a short-term store of
value and a partial standard of value, but also because value guarantees
may have implications for intervention techniques and thus for transaction
costs when a money (like the EPC) is a potential pivot currency. The value
guarantee which, in present circumstances, is most likely to be used for
an EPC pivot is the EUR CO-formula or some sort of qualified majority par-
valuation. The indexed basket cannot be expected to serve as a pivot except
in the medium term, provided the national member currencies return to
. approximate domestic price stability instead of being displaced by the
EPC. Since the return to domestic price stability in all member countries
(for the reasons stated in Section 1.2.) need not lead to exchange-rate
constancy, an indexed-basket pivot around which to stabilise intra-
Community exchange rates might indeed be a useful instrument: by offering
an exchange-rate target consistent with approximate domestic price stability,
it might reestablish fixed exchange rates as a universally acceptable policy
objective. • ' ....•.:.• •• ....
2.1.4.3. The Optimal EC Value Guarantee'- A Synthesis
The preceding analysis has shown that there may be no EPC value guarantee
that is optimal for all functions of money. Nevertheless it seems safe to
conclude that an EPC defined as an indexed basket of member currencies
would offer a maximum of advantages. It would be most useful as a standard
of value and, if it can be made to coincide with a no-seigniorage solution,
as a store of value, the two functions of money for which value guarantees
matter most. As a standard of value it eliminates the risks implied by
inflation and purely nominal exchange-rate changes and minimises the risk- 34 -
of real exchange-rate changes. It represents a way of dealing with two of
the most serious economic problems that are presently confronting the
Community: inflation (instability of price levels) and instability of exchange
rates.
The other solutions that have been suggested seem even less desirable.
From a theoretical point" of view, the indexed-basket EPC is, no doubt, a
second-best solution compared with an immediate return to price stability
of national currencies and with immediate currency unification or a perfect
coordination of national demand management resulting in constant equilibrium
exchange'rates. But given that the first-best solution'does not appear
attainable in the present real world, indexation to deal with instability
of purchasing power, and currency baskets to deal with exchange-rate
instability, seem preferable to the distortions which a fixing of nominal
values and of disequilibrium exchange rates is bound to produce,
2.1.4.6. "Backing" the Value Guarantee
Modern monetary history has shown that fiat money will also be held and used
by the public when it is not backed by precious metal or other real
assets, provided the general belief prevails that it will maintain its
approximate purchasing power. However, when inflation develops, money tends
to gradually lose the functions of s-tore and standard of value and finally,
in hyperinflation, even if it is legal or forced tender, its role as a
means of payment. It might be concluded by analogy that an EPC which
promises constant purchasing power could also do without backing.
However, trust in the stability of a currency depends not only on
promises but also on past experience. A new currency, like the EPC, cannot
benefit from a good record of price stability; moreover, being a supra-
national currency, there may appear to be some risk that its use would be
prohibited by national member states which leave the union or that the
union might collapse. For these reasons, there may be a case for keeping
the EPC supply that is issued backed by, and reconvertible into, some
familiar and sufficiently liquid assets at the conversion rate implied
by the value guarantee. Since a direct commodity backing would seem to in-
volve an unnecessarily high resource cost, the EPC Bank would be well ad-
vised to hold national EC currencies and other highly liquid assets denomi-
nated in them. These could be obtained either from the public to whom the
EPC is issued or from the member governments. Since the EPC would appreciate- 35 -
vis-a-vis the inflation-prone national currencies, perfect EPC backing would
on the average
moreover require that/the EPC Bank earned a non-negative real rate of inter-
est on its assets. If, for example, all"EPC were issued in exchange for
national EC currencies and if the amounts of national EC currency obtained
were not to be reinvested in private markets and thus rechannelled into
circulation; the national central banks would have to pay a nominal rate of
interest equal to the rate of inflation (i.e. a zero real rate of interest)
on the amount of their national currency deposited with them by the EPC
Bank. Thus the larger the part of the inflation tax which the member states
have levied on the holders of money and which they would now lose,, the
larger amounts would be converted for EPC. Moreover, the"EPC Bank would
have to receive compensation from the national central banks for the real
interest it pays on outstanding balances of high-powered EPC as far as
this is feasible.
If EPC were only issued in exchange for national member currencies
and if the national currencies obtained were reinvested in interest-
bearing claims on national central banks, the EPC Bank would operate like
a financial intermediary. It would be like a unit trust except that the
claims it issued upon itself would be money, i.e. perfectly liquid. Compared
with a private institution which might engage in such intermediation and
reinvest its national currency receipts in private capital markets, the
EPC Bank would merely benefit from the advantage (subsidy) that, backed by
the national centralbanks as lenders of first and last resort, it would
not have to obey the principles of banking prudence.
If the EPC were used to finance expenditure or loans, the unit-trust
principle would require member governments to indemnify the EPC Bank
through equivalent payments of national currency. If the EPC were issued
in exchange for non-EC currencies, say, the dollar, at the conversion rate
implied by the indexed basket, the unit-trust principle would demand that
the dollars received could be reinvested either privately or with the
Federal Reserve System in sufficiently liquid dollar assets which earned <*•( G«i
the same real rate of interest as the national member currencies or that the
national central banks of the EC member countries transferred part of their
foreign exchange (dollar) reserves to the EPC Bank to fill the gap. If such
transfers became necessary the EPC Bank would automatically and gradually
absorb EC reserves of non-EC foreign exchange in a reserve pool. But since
such transfers would indicate that the Community paid seigniorage (or even- 36 -
inflation tax) to the issuers of depreciating non-member currencies (just
as it does when.it intervenes in support of a weak non-member currency),
issues of EPC in exchange for non-EC currencies which required such trans-
fers v.'ould hardly be in the Community's interest.
Alternatively, the national central banks in the Community could use
their foreign exchange reserves to indemnify the EPC Bank for the losses
of purchasing power to which its holdings of national EC currencies will
be subject. However, these contributions of foreign exchange reserves will
have to be clearly earmarked so that the member central bank which gave them
can be asked for compensation whenever they yield less than national' currency
contributions would have done.
If all foreign exchange reserves owned by the member countries were
pooled with the EPC Bank from the start, member countries could dispense
with payments to the EPC Bank until their contribution had been absorbed by
their obligations to indemnify it on its holdings of national member currency
From a psychological point of view this solution might be advantageous. The
national central banks are likely to prefer it because it permits them, for
some time at least, to show solidarity by contributing to a reserve pool
instead of paying interest on that part of their money which the European
public has rejected. Moreover, to the public an."irrevocable" transfer of
assets from the national to the Community level may appear as a stronger
backing than a mare promise to pay. When the volume of the reserve pool
has been absorbed by the interest obligations of the member central banks,
the EPC may already be so well established and generally trusted, that
backing of further issues would be unnecessary. The EPC would no longer
have to have an "intrinsic" or "fallback" value; its value, as one writer
has put it, would be purely "extrinsic", i.e. demand for it would exclusively
depend on its usefulness, in particular on its expected stability of value.- 37 -
2.2. Minimising Interference with National Monetary Policies
According to some authors, the EPC Bank should have f&r-reaehing
to
competences""'contx^ol overall monetary policy" in the Community, notably to
"ensure consistency between the general Community policy and the policies
being pursued in individual states" (i.e. to stabilise intra-Cornmunity
exchange rates). Others'"have recognized that this would very probably in-
volve too high ai degree of interference with.national monetary policies to
be acceptable to member governments and have therefore concluded that, on the
contrary, the EPC Bank should be barred from selling EPC directly to the.
public. Insteadjthe supply of EPC available for issue should be allocated
to the national central banks in exchange for national currency or, to
prevent an increase in the international liquidity that is freely available
to them, in exchange for a corresponding amount of their gold and foreign
exchange reserves. In this case the EPC Bank would at the same time be a
reserve pool and might be used to stabilise the EPC's external value while
the national central banks might be increasingly restricted to interventions
vis-a-vis the EPC (pivot solution).
In the light of what has been said about the desirability of value-
maintenance provisions in the preceding section (2.1.), this controversy
does not appear relevant. If the EPC is subject to some sort of
long-term value guarantee vis-a-vis one currency or a basket of currencies,
the equilibrium quantity of EPC that can and must be supplied is prede-
termined. In this case, the EPC Bank enjoys no discretion whatsoever; its
"monetary policy" merely consists of supplying as much EPC as is necessary
to validate the guaranteed EPC value. Whether the public obtained the EPC
directly from the EPC Bank or only from the national central banks, would
make no difference: the quantity that would have to be supplied would be
the same. But while the method of Issuing the EPC has no effect on the size
of the EPC supply, it is almost certain to have a bearing on the rate of
inflation of the national member currencies.
2.2.1. The EPC Issuing Mechanism
The EPC, or rather its high-powered component (the monetaxv base), can
be issued in five ways.:- 38 -
- to finance purchases of goods and services (eg. by the EC Commission),
- to finance loans (eg. for regional development),
- to purchase or repurchase financial assets (open-market operations),
to purchase non-EC currencies (notably the dollar),
to purchase national-member currencies.
If the EPC Bank used one of the first four methods, it would increase the
total nominal money supply from monetary authorities in the Community;
with the exception of EPC issued in exchange for non-EC eurocurrency,
it would thereby . also/''
6
 Sthe total nominal money supply available for
transactions in the Community. But if the EPC could be used more freely
in Community transactions than non-EC eurocurrency , the fourth issuing
method, too, would be bound to increase nominal Community liquidity.
To the extent that the issue of an EPC of stable purchasing power
and the payment of interest on the EPC reserves of commercial banks would -
raise the demand for real money balances, additions to the money supply
available in the Community could be absorbed without a 'simultaneous de-
crease in the demand for national currency. However,' to the extent that
EPC were demanded not in addition to given balances of national currency
but as a substitute for them, the EPC could t\oi possibly add to real money
balances; thus,unless the national central banks withdrew national currency
(or increased its supply less than they would otherwise have done), in-
flation would reduce the value of increased nominal money balances
until the equilibrium volume of real money balances were restored.
Since an EPC of constant purchasing power cannot,, by definition, be subject
to inflation, the adjustment would (ceteris paribus) liave to be brought
about through inflation (and depreciation) of the national currencies.For this reason, the national central banks must not reissue the amounts
of national currency which the public sells to the EPC Bank and which the
 :
EPC Bank withdraws from circulation. The targets of national money supply
policy w*23 have to be defined not in terms of nominal supply of
national money in circulation but in terms of rates of issue of national
money measured in percent of the current and changing quantity of national
money in circulation.
It is the advantage of the conversion method of issuing the EPCthat
it does not require the national central banks to act to avoid s*<-l\ in-
flationary implications. However, there are three other factors which
would demand an active adjustment of national monetary policy if given
national price level targets were still to be attained!
First of all, the national central banks would have to allow for the
fact that EPC balances once they are in circulation do not lose their
• purchasing power as the national money replaced by them would have done;
this means that the target amount of- issue of national money would have
to be reduced by the amount of the' inflation tax which the central banks
would have earned on the national money supply now replaced by the EPC.
Secondly, an analo^o^y argument applies to the interest which the EPC
Bank would pay on the EPC reserves of commercial banks: the target amount
of issue of national money would have to be reduced by the seigniorage
gains which the central banks would have earned (i.e. t^ the interest pay-
ments which they would have saved) on the reserves of national currency
now replaced by the EPC.
Finally, the central banks would have to allow for the increase in
the demand for real money ,balances that might be expected when a new
currency of constant EC purchasing power is supplied. National price level
targets remaining unchanged, the target amount of issue of national money
would have to be augmented by the ,increase in demand for real balances.
In summary, the conversion method of issue seems optimal in that it
does not require the national central banks to- compensate for all issues
of EPC through active withdrawals of national money. However, if given
national price level targets are to be attained, they will have to allow- 40 -
for losses of inflation tax and seigniorage and for increases in demand
for real balances; but as long as national inflation targets are high
and rates of real growth positive, these adjustments are quite unlikely to
require net withdrawals of nominal supply of national money by national
central banks. ,- .
If the issuing of EPC in exchange for dollars did not prove profitable,
not only the conversion method but also the unit-trust principle would »
imply that the Eurodollar could not be converted for EPC at the EPC Bank.
But it would be a fallacy to believe that the EPC issuing mechanism deter-
mines whether the Eurodollar loses its market share in the Community. The
offer of an EPC of constant EC purchasing power is very likely to shift
demand for money from the Eurodollar (and the other non-EC currencies)
to the EPC. If Eurodollars were not accepted by the EPC Bank, there would
be an excess supply of dollars; i.e.. unless the Federal Reserve System
reduced the supply of dollars by an equivalent amount (or Increased it less
than it would otherwise have done), the dollar would experience a higher
rate of inflation and (ceteris paribus) depreciate vis-a-vis the national
EC currencies and, even more so, vis-a-vis the EPC. Thus the share of £M.ro-
dollars in the real EC money supply would be reduced.
If the national EC central banks wanted to rca.«A their price level
targets, they would not be permitted to resist to the depreciation of the
dollar. But if the EPC could only be obtained in exchange for EC member
currencies, they would have to allow for the fact that their currencies
would be increasingly used for conversion purposes. They should-satisfy
the increased transaction demand for their national currencies, thus
preventing a lower than planned rate of inflation and a higher than planned
appreciation of their currencies. Just as the present vehicle-currency role
of the dollar permits the Federal Reserve System to issue dollars (interest-
free loans) without increasing the rate of dollar inflation, the future
role of the national EC currencies as an intermediary or vehicle for exter-
nal EPC demand would allow the central banks of the member countries to
issue more of their currencies while upholding their price level targets:
there would be a transfer of seigniorage from external issued to the national
EC countries. It is true that the central banks of the member countries
would now have to pay interest on the amounts of their currencies which- 41 -
the original holders of non~EC currencies had acquired and then sold to
the EPC Bank for €Pc- but while they ceased to earn seigniorage on those
balances, they could replenish the supply of their currencies by exactly
the same amount and would earn exactly the same amount of seigniorage on
these. Thus there remains the net increase of seigniorage owing to the in-
creased demand for national member currencies for EPC conversion.
The preceding analysis shows that the Community would lose seigniorage
if EPC were issued only in exchange for non-EC currencies as some authors
have suggested. This conclusion holds regardless of whether the EPC is to
displace the national EC currencies or only the non-EC eurocurrencies
(provided such discrimination could be enforced).
Nevertheless, the Community might consider issuing EPC in exchange for
non-member currencies if it is demanded for extra-Community transaction or
reserve purposes. Whether it does so should depend on the profitability
of investments in these non-member currencies, the loss of transaction
seigniorage involved and the difficulty of determining whether the national
member currency that is exchanged for EPC under the EC conversion mechanism
comes from original non-EC currency holders and is thus to be reissued or
/ it is rejected by Community residents and thus to be frozen.
There remains the question whether the EPC should be issued in ex-
change for amounts of national EC currency however these are composed or
precisely that
only in exchange for / EC currency basket as which it is defined. If
the latter mechanism (basket conversion) were used, cross-rates between
the national member currencies would (ceteris paribus) be affected if the
distribution of demand for EPC among holders of the various national EC
currencies would not correspond to the respective weights of these curren-
cies in the EPC basket formula . To prevent an unplanned disinflation and
appreciation of the national EC currencies whose holders' demanded pro-
portionately less EPC than corresponds to the weight which these currencies
have in the EPC basket, the central banks of the member countries concerned
would have to reissue the difference. Since they would obtain seigniorage on
the reissue, the conversion of their national currencies by original holders
of the other national EC currencies and the conse uent interest payments
on these amounts would not give rise to a net loss of seigniorage. On the
contrary, to the extent that the conversions by original holders of other- 42 -
member currencies increased the transaction demand for the proportionately
less rejected national EC currencies, they would be able to issue additional
amounts of their currency and hence earn more seigniorage than would have
been the case if the demand for EPC were distributed among the holders of
national EC currencies according to"weights of these currencies in the bas-
ket. Obviously, the reverse applies to the member countries whose curren-
cies are rejected in larger amounts than their weights would allow: these
central banks would have to withdraw national currency.
If the interference with national monetary policies were to be
minimised, «£ mono-currency conversion mechanism should be adopted. In
this case an EC national who wanted to hold EPC rather than his national
currency could obtain the desired sum of EPC directly in exchange for that
amount of his national currency which he would need if he wanted to buy
on exchange markets the other currencies required b^ the basket conversion
method. The exchange rate between his national currency and the EPC
(V ) would be given by the formula V = — where W is the fractional
1 1 fcj. 1
weight in the basket which his national currency (i) has at prevailing
cross-rates and where Q. is the amount of his national currency in the bas-
ket formula. Under the mono -currency conversion mechanism the cross-rate
effects which result from basket conversion would not arise: the supply of
the rejected national member currency would fall by the same amount as
demand for it had fallen (given the prevailing set of exchange rates). Of
course, this conclusion would not hold if the EPC Bank rearranged its port~
folio so as to bring the compostion of its assets into conformity with
the composition of the basket EPC (its liablities); if it did so, there -
would be no difference between basket conversion and mono-currency con-
version except that under mono-currency conversion the EPC Bank would bear
the costs of exchange and the risk that its sales of excessively converted
national currencies might depress their exchange value below the implicit
cross-rates at which the EPC Bank had accepted them.
If the EPC Bank permitted a discrepancy to develop between the currency
composition ' of its assets and its liabilities, the central banks
whose currencies had been converted for EPC in excess of their weights in
the basket would have to pay correspondingly more interest so as to keep
the value of the assets of the EPC Bank in line with the guaranteed- 43 -
appreciation of the outstanding EPC balances. Thus these central banks
would have to bear the risk that the real exchange rate of their curren-
cies might depreciate vis-a-vis the EC average or that the real rate of
interest on investments in their currencies might be lower than the EC
average^ for the payment of which they would have to indemnify the EPCBank.
While mono-currency conversion is likely to be more efficient than basket
conversion, it involves a less proportionate distribution of costs and •
benefits betv/een the Community members.
2.2.2. Reserve Requirements Concurrency Deposits
Ii. has been suggested that EPC demand deposits should not be subject
to reserve requirements because the required ratio of reserves would either
be held anyway (in which case public regulation is superfluous) or it
would be too high (in which case it represents a tax on commercial bank
intermediation). In the latter case, it produces either a shift of inter-
mediation Aua^. from the commercial banks w/v.cA. are specialised in it or
it results in disintermediation altogether. Another reason that has been <j«Ve«\
for dispensing with reserve requirements on EPC deposits is that the EPC
ought to be on an equal footing with eurocurrency deposits if it is to
outcompete them. However, the attractiveness of the EPC is not en hanced
by the absence of reserve requirements if the alternative is minimum re-
serves on which a market rate of interest is paid by the EPC Bank (as has
been suggested).
What ai'-guments are there against a system of voluntary reserve holding
by commercial banks? Obviously, it cannot be objected that the lack of
reserve requirements would- permit an excessive or unpredictable expansion
of EPC supply, for the supply of EPC is controlled through the conversion
operations of the EPC-Bank and is determined by the demand forthcoming at
the guaranteed EPC conversion rates. Reserve requirements are not needed
for the purpose of monetary control because the value guarantee to which
the EPC is subject sets by itself the limit to EPC expansion. For example,
if the ratio of voluntary EPC reserves fell and the effective bank multiplier
for EPC deposits rose, the EPC Bank would (ceteris paribus) be obliged by
the value guarantee it has given to reduce the EPC monetary base through
sales of national currencies.- 44
A second objection which might be raised against a system of voluntary
reserves for the EPC is that commercial banks may chooS« too low a ratio
and thereby increase the danger of bank illiquidity and failure. Experience
with eurocurrency markets hitherto offers little evidence of such financial
imprudence, but, of course, historical observations are never conclusive
when the future is concerned.
Finally, there is the question whether the issue 1 of EPC reserve re-
.quirements matters for the degree of non-interference with national monetary-
policies. If *w the mono-currency conversion mechanism an amount X of
member currency A is converted for EPC at the EPC Bank, the supply of A
will be reduced by aX and the supply of EPC will increase by eX where a
and e are the effective money multipliers for currency A and the EPC,
respectively. If the required reserve ratio for A is higher than the ratio
which commercial banks would hold voluntarily and if there are no reserve
requirements £>r EPC deposits a will be smaller than e. In this case, the
increase in the EPC supply will be greater than the reduction of the no-
minal supply of A. This conclusion holds irrespective of whether the EPC
value guarantee would oblige the EPC Bank to repurchase (e-l)X and hence
to prevent EPC multiplication or not. If a is smaller than e, the increase
in the total nominal money supply of EPC and A that results from any con-
version of A for EPC-would require that, ignoring possible increases in
the
1 demand for real balances and given unchanged price level targets for A,
the central bank concerned should reduce the supply of A by (e-a)X. Obvious-
ly the compensatory adjustments of national monetary policy that would be
necessary would be the smaller the more cUfdy the EPC effective money
multiplier approximated the weighted average money multiplier and the more
similar these were among the national member countries. However, to the extent
that EPC is held more in the form of notes and currency than the national
monies because in the case of cash the loss of purchasing power cannot be
compensated by interest payments, equality of effective money multipliers
would require a^lower reserve ratio for EPC ;deposits.But just as existing
differences between national money multipliers have not created noticeable
difficulties when monetary movements between the member countries occurred
in the past, there is every reason to assume that even "massive", "sudden"
and "speculative" movements of funds into (and possibly out of) the EPC- 45 r
could easily be allowed for by adjustments of national money supply policy.
Indeed, to a large extent the shifts from the national EC currencies into
the EPC would be a substitute for the shifts which are now experienced be-
tween the national member currencies and which are at least as difficult
to compensate.
When it is sometimes objected that the coexistence in one country of
two currencies which may be used for domestic transactions v/ould increase
currency speculation and hence the volatility of funds, two assumptions
are made which seem debatable. The first assumption is that specu-
lation tends to destabilise rather than to stabilise exchange rates (or
smooth exchange-rate changes) in the medium and long term. Secondly, it is
supposed that funds will move out of the EPC Just as easily as they move
into it. It is very probable, however, that shifts into the Efifwill prove
largely irreversible; confidence in the stability of the national curren-
cies is much more likely to be shaken than confidence in a no-seigiorage
EPC of constant purchasing power, backed"equivalent assets. Indeed, the
EPC is likely to function as a haven not only for part of the "oil funds"
but also for that part of European liquidity which, owing to bloc floating
(i.e. the increased short-term exchange risk vis-a.-v.is the dollar and. its
replacement as an intra-EC intervention currency) has moved out of the
dollar into European currencies but is still suffering from the depreciation
(inflation) risk.
Whether and how high a reserve ratio is finally fixed for EPC deposits
would depend on whether more weight is given to the objective of unfettered
commercial bank intermediation or to the objectives of preventing bank
illiquidity and of minimising interference with national monetary policies.
The implications of the parallel-currency approach for national money
supply policies can at this stage be summarized. If national price level
targets are to be maintained, the issue of EPC requires certain compen-
satory adjustments in national monetary policies. These adjustments can be
kept small by an appropriate issuing mechanism and appropriate reserve
requirements for EPC deposits, but just as they are necessitated by any
shifts between the national member currencies and the eurocurrency market,
in particular the non-EC eurocurrencies, nowadays, they cannot be avoided
completely in the case of EPC conversion. However, unlike under a systemof fixed exchange rates, ultimate monetary sovereignty is not lost. The
national member states will be free to bring about any national rate of
inflation or any national money supply they wish. What will change is
merely the rate of inflation implied by a given national monetary policy
and vice versa. Indeed, the national central banks will be free to prevent
any issue of EPC whatsoever by keeping their own currencies sufficiently
scarce and thus stable and by paying interest on the reserves of their
currency which are held by commercial banks.
2.2.3. Limiting the Supply of EPC
While some commentators have expressed the opinion that a parallel
currency would not be accepted by the public unless it were forced upon it
and that demand deposits and other contracts denominated in a European unit
of account of constant purchasing power would already be a common feature
on European markets if such a unit were really useful, others have argued
that the type of EPC suggested would be too attractive to permit a gradual
process of substitution and that for this reason the parallel-currency
approach would be politically unacceptable to EC member governments.
The precise speed of EPC penetration,it is true, is hard to predict.
To prevent the EPC from outcompeting -the national member currencies
in a year or two and hencefrom running counter tote principle of gradualism,
the member governments could choose to set ceilings on the annual rate of
issue of EPC. In this case the EPC Bank would have to stop offering
EPC altogether once the ceiling had been reached,,
To fix the ceiling the member governments should, first of all, agree
on the earliest acceptable date for complete currency unification. They would
then estimate the Community demand for total real balances that is likely
to prevail in each year up to that date allowing for both the real interest
(inflation) elasticity and the income elasticity of demand for money;
finally, they could ensure a constant 'speed of maximum EPC penetration by
raising the ceiling for the accumulated supply of EPC each year to
i N
where
N is the number of years from the date of the agree-
ment to the earliest acceptable date of currency
unification,
1 is the ordinal number of the year measured from the
date of the agreement, and where
L. is the expected demand for real balances in the
Community in year i.- 47 -
Issues of EPC to original holders of non-EC currencies would'not fall under
this ceiling. However, if it proved too difficult to obtain more than a
very rough estimate of their volume, demand for EPC from present holders
of non-EC currencies could also be estimated in advance and be added to
the L • rj ceiling. It may even be that during a preliminary stage only the
estimated demand of non-EC currency holders ,': chosen as a ceiling. In
this case, the EPC^ce4ii-ng should be equal to the monetary base of these
deposits.
While ceilings on the issue of EPC have indubitable and substantial
political advantages, they have also indubitable and substantial economic
disadvantages. For whenever a ceiling is reached, the market value of the
EPC would rise above its guaranteed value, i.e. the EPC would lose its
usefulness as a standard of value, while its attractiveness as a store
of value would be only temporarily increased. Since the benefits of an
inflation-proof standard of value are likely to exceed the benefits of
an EPC siore of value, the best way of incorporating issuing ceilings in
the EPC strategy is probably to split the s{ore and standard functions
temporarily, i.e. to keep the indexed basket as the EC standard of value
and to separately introduce the EPC as a siore of value and means of pay-
ment. The economic disadvantage consists then of avoidable costs of in-
formation (diseconomies of small scale) which diminish the usefulness of
both the indexed basket standard of value and of the EPC. It is one
pf the damaging consequences of inflation that the means of payment is no
longer used as a standard of value; precisely this decomposition of the
functions of money would fail to be prevented if ceilings were imposed on'
the issue of EPC.
• "Nevertheless, such ceilings would be of a global nature and would
not imply the interference v/ith, and distortions of, the currency pattern
of private transactions which restrictions on the use of EPC balances
would entail.- 48 - •' '
2.2.4. Restricting the Use of the EPC
Restrictions on the use of the EPC can concern each of the
three functions of money. However, the most frequent
suggestion is to restrict the EPC's use as a means of pay-
ment and a standard of value while admitting it freely as
a store o-f value.
Among/the proposals that have been made, the most plau-
sible suggestion is to prohibit the EPC in all trans-
actions between residents of the same member country;
the EPC could (then not be used to denominate contracts
between residents of the same member country nor for
payments between them. At first sight this suggestion
seems unobjectionable. The restriction proposed, it is
true, would limit the economic benefits of the EPC and
would hence be clearly a second-best solution from an
economic point of view; but quite apart from its great
political appeal, an indexed-basket EPC for international
use only would,~in econanic terms as well, represent at
least an improvement on. the present situation. At the
very least, as some skeptics have argued, it would pennit
a controlled test of the usefulness of the indexed-basket
formula.
While there is little doubt that this solution would be
better than nothing, it is not at all certain that it could
be attained in practice. Cither the indexed-basket
EPC is highly attractive as a store and standard of value
and as a means of payment although its use Is permitted
only in international transactions; in this case it would
seem extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prevent
its use also in domestic transactions. Or the ERC, being
permitted only for international transactions, would lack
economies of scale and hence economic appeal to such an
extent that, after a short trial period, it would be
rejected by the market; indeed, restrictions might be
the most effective way to wreck the whole parallel-currency
approach and to discredit the aim of currency unification
altogether.- 49 -
These objections will have the greater weight, _the more the
restrictions lose their global nature, i.e. for example,
if the EPC could only be used by banks, or by companies,
/ or at least not for salary payments and retail purchases,
or if it's use were" confined to transactions above a
minimum/ amount or if it were only issued In the form of
deposits or of deposits and large notes as has been sugges-
ted. Moreover, the more these restrictions,infringed
upon the micro-level, the less the EPC would succeed in
raising micro-rinonetary efficiency.
This'conclusion holds in particular for exchange controls.
Since the EPC is primarily designed to facilitate trans-
actions between residents of different EC member countries ,
effective exchange controls would impair its usefulness
more than the usefulness of the national member currencies.
On the other hand, if the EPC nevertheless proved to be
a more useful money than the national currencies, those
member states which have erected the highest barrier- of
controls would be accused by their own citizens of depri-
ving them of advantages, which the nationals of other mem-
ber countries could freely enjoy. If such public pressure
did not suffice.to start a competitive reduction of ex-
change controls, they might become increasingly unenforce-
able. Evasion would become the easier, the more the EPC
were also used in domestic transactions.
2.2.5. Confinement to a European Unit of Account
An inflation-proof standard of value is not only likely to
offer more benefits than an inflation-proof store of value
and means of payment
1, it is also likely to meet'leas political
resistance from the member governments and the member cen-
tral banks. This is because the issue of a parallel
currency implies a loss of seigniorage and a need for
compensatory adjustments of national monetary policies
while the use and promotion of a parallel unit of account
does not. Hence a number of authors have suggested applying
the principle of gradualism "to the monetary .functions .of the EPC
as well". * Several stages could be envisaged. The indexed- 50 -
basket could become successively
- an administrative unit of account used by the Community
institutions,
-. an official reserve asset and means of settlement issued
Yby the European Fund for Monetary Co-operation (in ex-
charge for gold and foreign exchange reserves held by
menvber central banks), • ' •
- a private unit of account used for accounting purposes
and to denominate private contracts (including bonds,
loans, and bank accounts),
- a scriptural (deposit) money, and finally
- a full parallel currency.
Since the same type of value guarantee, namely, the indexed
basket, is most appropriate for each of these purposes (compare
the analysis in Section 2.1.4.2.), there would be no problem
in passing from one stage to the next: the indexed basket
would merely be given one monetary function after the
other. However, any other type of value guarantee would
imply a breakdown of this process at one point or another:
the market would reject it. For example, if an unattractive
standard like par-valuation or a currency option were chosen
as an administrative unit of account, it would be rejected
as a private unit of account. Similarly, if an attractive
but suboptimal standard like EURCO were introduced for
administrative purposes and also gained acceptance aS a
private unit of account, the process would break down when
the attempt were made to issue a parallel currency
denominated in this way; for as a store of value it would be j
inferior to the strongest member currencies.
Although the indexed-basket formula - and only the indexed- ' i
i
basket formula - would permit a "passage en douceur" from \
one stage to the next, such functional gradualism, even
more than restrictions on EPC use, involves, the risk that
the indexed basket will fail to overcome the diseconomies
of small scale which have prevented its entry as a private
unit of account in the past. This barrier may be so high- 51 -
for any new unit that even an indexed-basket standard
of value that were used by the Community institutions
would fail to be attractive enough to the market. The
promotion of the new product is likely to require a
.comprehensive marketing strategy, the mutual reinforcement
which a simultaneous launching as a risk-reducing stan-
dard of value and a high-yield store of value would offer.
Moreover, the earlier seigniorage begins to be reduced,
the better for micromonetary efficiency.
2.'2.6. Transition to the Final Stafre
The loss of monetary sovereignty that is suffered by the
national member governments would /xlie smaller , - the later
the moment in which they had to stop the issue
of national money. In theory, the national central banks
could, of course, be left free to issue national money
ad infinitum. However, such sovereignty would be purely
formal; for if all newly-issued national money were im-
mediately exchanged for EPC at the EPC Bank, the national
central banks would no longer earn seigniorage or
regulate a money supply of national currency. In addition,
it would be a highly cumbersome and inefficient system.
Hence it seems advisable to stop new issues of national
money once the EPC accounts for an overwhelming proportion
of total real money balances from Community sources.The
precise percentage might conveniently be agreed upon In ad-
vance. The consequent "limping" national-currency standard
would finally be succeeded by full currency union as the
remaining national money balances would be converted for
what would now become the unique Community Currency. It is
at this stage at the very latest that the EPC Bank would
become a full-fledged EC Central Bank. The Community Curren-
cy would no longer be issued in exchange for national
currencies, but in the same way as the national currencies
before. (The implications of this step for the maintaina-
bility of the EC value guarantee have been analysed in• - 52 -
Section 2.1,4.2.7.)
3. The Prospective Process and Pattern of EPC Penetration
By whom and for which purposes would an EPC of constant
EC purchasing power be used first? How and at which
speed would it spread over the Community?
In principle, It is clear that the economies of scale in
the- use of money should make for continuous acceleration
in the process of EPC expansion. This is because the
EPC will become the more attractive,
- the more numerous the functions for which it is
used by an economic agent (individual economies of
scale),
- the more people use it (social economies of scale), and
- the longer it has been used (temporal economies of scale).
While individual and social economies of scale concern the
cost of both information and exchange, temporal economies
of scale are only economics in information costs, i.e.
in the use of memory; they obey learning-by-doing laws.
Beyond this general conclusion, a prognosis of the process
and especially the pattern of EPC penetration in the
Community (and - in an analogous way - outside) requires
a neat distinction between the EPC's functions as a standard
of value, store of value and means of payment.
3.1. The EPC as a Standard of Value
The indexed-basket standard of value eliminates the inflation
risk and it minimises the risk which real exchange-rate
changes involve for the partners to an international con-
tract. Thus two groups of prospective users can be dis-
tinguished.
3.1.1. Exchange Risk
As has been explained in Section 2.1.4J2.4, an EPC ofconstant EC purchasing power eliminates the risk inherent
in nominal exchange-rate changes and distributes the re-
maining risk of real exchange-rate changes so as to mini-
mise its disutility and to avoid the diseconomies of
small scale in information costs which a multitude of
bilateral indexed currency baskets would produce. It
follows that the EPC will spread the faster as a stan-
dard of value, the larger(and less predictable) tkt. real
exchange-rate changes in the Community. In the first place,
the EPC will be used by those who have to fear exchange
rislc-most, i.e. by those companies and citizens who are
most active in. trade and capital transactions between
the member countries. The EPC will be the more attractive
for them, the more the pattern of their transactions corre •
sponds to the weights which the individual member currencies
have in the indexed basket. Since the central regions are
both most "open" in terms of trade and capital transactions
with othei' member countries and likely to show a more
balanced pattern of transactions which corresponds more
nearly to the composition by currency of the indexed bas-
ket, EPC penetration should be expected to exhibit a
"centralist bias". From the point of view of exchange risk,
the EPC will have the least appeal with a local public
like retailers, workers etc. who traditionally deal only
in one currency and would face particularly high costs
of information and of transaction or portfolio manage-
ment if they employed a parallel currency.
3.1.2. Inflation Risk .
The inflation-proof EPC standard of value will spread the
faster in the Community.the greater the variations in
the rate of inflation of the national member currencies
and the faster remaining money illusion is eroded.
Variations in the rates of inflation and awareness of them,
in turn, are likely to be the greater, the higher the
rates of inflation in the member countries. Since the EPC
will contribute to the destruction of money illusion, its
penetration will be self-validating and self-accelerating in
this respect~ as well',• A further element of self-accele-
ration is the fact thTat the stability of the national member- 54 -
currencies will become increasingly sensitive to all sorts
of shocks as national currency domains shrink ("law of
small numbers"). On the other hand, the approaching of
the final stage at which the European currency's value
can no longer be maintained with precision through inter-
ventions vis-a-vis national member currencies, will act
as a brake on the process of EPC penetration. But since
the indexed-basket standard of value can be used as a
contract unit independently of the value of the Communi-
ty currency, this deceleration effect is likely to be small.
The disadvantage that arises' as the final stage comes
nearer is merely the increasing risk of diseconomies of
small scale which the split between the indexed-basket
standard and the European currency would imply.
National currency inflation and the erosion of money
illusion will also determine the geographical pattern of
EPC penetration. The inflation-proof EPC standard of value
will spread at first in the high-inflation countries
where the inflation risk and the awareness of it tend to
be greatest. The awareness of inflation risk will also
depend on the extent to which "index-linking has been
permitted in the various member countries in the past.
If private economic agents are familiar with delis linked
to the national cost-of-living index, the step towards the
indexed-basket standard would involve little information
cost. On the other hand, national index clauses would
compete with the indexed-basket standard and hamper its
use in contracts between nationals because they are better
tailored to protect against national inflation risks. While
it is obvious that the indexed basket standard would
spread fastest in member countries in which the use of
national index clauses had been unrestricted in the past,
but were restricted at the time of the launching of the EPC,
it remains thus -an open question whether the indexed bas-
ket standard would spread faster where the use of national
Index clauses remained restricted than where it remained- 55 -
unrestricted.
It is also not quite clear whether, from the point of view
of inflation risk taken in isolation, the indexed basket is
more likely to spread in the central or in the peripheral
regions of the Community. On the one hand, there is evidence
that inflation rates tend to be higher in the peripheral
regions since wage bargains and monetary policy fail to
fully compensate for their less favourable location and
their consequently lower increases in marginal value
productivity. On the other hand, the awareness of in-
flation risk is likely to be more pronounced in the big
enterprises which tend to have their seats near the
Community's industrial centre (Southern England, the
North-East of France, the Benelux Countries and the
Rhine valley).
Since fluctuations in the rate of inflation are most like-
ly in the small and Lt-SC diversified countries, inflation
risk is a further reason why the EPC should spread par-
ticularly there.
Further, it is certain that the indexed-basket standard will
be used in the first place for long-term contracts, for the
longer the term of the contract, the larger the po-
tential inflation risk. Thus the indexed basket can be
expected to denominate mainly forward supply contracts
for investment goods, energy (oil!), ship-building and
construction, long-term leases, leaseholding, pensions,
alimonies and insurances and, most of all, debts on capital
markets where both income .(interest) and principal call
for protection against a loss of purchasing power.
Experience on international capital markets suggests that
bonds etc. tend to be denominated in the strongest
currencies or units. Apparently, interest-rate differentials
fail to fully reflect expected exchange-rate changes. More-
over, this preference for denominations in strong currencies
and units seems to be due to the fact that some member coun-
tries do not tax long-term capital gains or tax th«m at
a lower rate than interest earnings. Since indexed bonds etc.
i • . tend to- 56 -
offer a low nominal interest rate but a high nominal capi-
tal gain, the indexed-basket standard is most attractive
for lenders (and hence borrowers) in these countries
especially, of cotirse, for lenders in high income tax brack-
ed S. On the other hand, it would not be attractive for
lenders who had to pay full income tax on capital gains
on an increasingly progressive scale and whose assets did
not exhibit a continuous term structure; for since in- ,tend to
dexed bonas«oTfer lower nominal interest payments but a
higher nominal repayment of principal, the flow of receipts
is less evenly spread over time than in the case of non-
indexed bonds^unless, of course, the indexed bonds in the
individual's portfolio mature -it the same intervals as
interest instalments are paid.
Finally, as has been explained in Sections 2.1.4.2.2. and
2.1.4.2.4., any now standard of value is most likely to
be accepted by those who do not have net claims or net
obligations denominated in the old standard(s) against which
they wish to hedge. An inflation-proof standard, in
particular, will'be most attractive for ultimate buyer!" and
sellers of consumer goods whose nominal expenditure and
whose nominal receipts, respectively, are closely corre-
lated with the consumer price index. For these reasons,
the financial intermediaries may be slower in accepting
the indexed basket as their unit of account; moreover,
they may be under the impx-ession that an indexed standard
of value is not in their interest (because it tends to
destroy the money illusion that has remained with
small savers). It may.take some time before they realise that
the contrary is true (compare p.43).
3.2. The EPC as a Store of Value
Just as in its standard-of-value function, .the EPC of
constant EC purchasing power will spread the faster as a
store of value, the higher -t*.*. national rates of inflation.- 57 -
But while the attraction of the indexed-basket standard
of value is only due to the protection it offers against the
risks of inflation and of real exchange-rate changes, the
EPC store of value will also benefit from the higher
yield it earns as compared with inflating (and depreciating)
national member currencies. ^-i_i
tprobablyj
Since the EPC of constant EC purchasing power is*" "stronger"
than all these currencies, it is likely In the long run
to displace all of them as a store of value (provided the
risk-that it might be declared invalid or inconvertible is
considered small). In the short run, however, there may be
differences in the speed of EPC penetration between the
member countries: the proportion of national real money
supply that is replaced by EPC per unit of time will be
the larger, the faster the national member currency de-
preciates, i.e. the higher its rate of inflation and the
less favourable the real exchange-rate adjustments it
undergoes.
Secondly, the EPC will spread fastest in those member coun-
tries in which high rates of past inflation and experience
with indexation have left least money illusion. For the
EPC store of value it does not matter whether the respec-
tive member countries also permit national index clauses.
For .while national index clauses are a substitute for the
indexed-basket standard of value, they are not a rival for
the EPC store of value. National index clauses are not
national index currencies.
It has already been mentioned that, compared with national
money, the EPC would be more attractive in the form of
notes and currency than in the form of deposits on which
interest can be paid to compensate for loss of purchasing
power. This means that, thirdly, the inroads which the EPC
will make into a national member currency will be the greater,
the larger the proportion of notes and coins in the
national money supply and, more generally, the less interest
is paid on holdings of the national money (including demand• - 58 -
deposits). Given that interest-rate differentials fall the
shorter of expected exchange-rate changes, the shorter the
term of the asset concerned, it might further be concluded
that, compared with the corresponding national currency assets, 1EPC money would be more attractive than EPC quasi-
money and longer-term deposits. But probably these different
ces of attractiveness between the various forms of EPC
money and quasi-money are of relatively little importance.
In the first place, the choice between EPC coins, notes
demand deposits and term deposits will be affected by the
traditional asset preferences of the transactors to whom
the EPC appeals most in each of its three functions; and
these transactors are moi© likey to be big companies than
individual consumers and retailers^ who are the main users
of notes and coins.
3.3. The EPC as a Means of Payment
As has been explained (in Section 2.1.4.), a means of pay-
tmore useful, they .
ment will be tijuT"^niore attractive it is as a standard and ,
in particular, as a store of value. However, apart from the
criteria that have been identified hitherto, the EPC's
use as a means of payment will depend on one more factor:
the cost of exchanging one currency for another (or of
managing a multi-currency portfolio).
In no other function is money subject to greater economies
of scale than in its role as a means of payment. Being an
infant currency the EPC will thus be least attractive for
this role. Indeed, as far as costs of exchange are concerned,
the EPC will be far less attractive for domestic transactions
than the national member currencies. Initially • the dis-
incentive to use the EPC. as a means of payment will be
smallest for transactions with residents of other
countries and currency domains in which costs of ex-
change have to be born anyway, and it will be the smaller
for the individual transactor, the larger • his transaction
turnover across currency boundaries. Thus, from the point
of view of exchange costs, EPC penetration is most likely- 59 -
(or rather least unlikely) to begin in those areas which are
most "open" vis-a-vis other member countries, i.e. notably
in the smaller and central member countries and, in particu-
lar, in those of their regions which borfler on other member
countries", and in those of their industries which are most
actively engaged in international intra-Community .trans-
actions. The border of the EPC domain wotild then gradually
move like a linguistic frontier: currency dualism, having
started in the border regions, would spread into the
homeland, and as the next following regions got acquainted
with the parallel currency (language), the former border
regions would give up the less useful currency (language)
and return to a mono-currency (-language) standax'd.
To argue that the use of the EPC as* a means of payment will -be
least disadvantageous for cross-border transactions is,
of course, not to ignore that even in these transactions,
conversion via the EPC would cost far more than (initially
twice as much as)direct exchange of national currencies as
long as the EPC had not yet developed the economies of
scale which are a prerequisite for a vehicle currency.
Only when the EPC exchange markets had gained a greater
breacHk, depth and resiliency than the dollar market could the
EPC take over from the dollar.as the vehicle currency
which reduces the number of bilateral exchange markets from
n (n-1) , ., ^
 L to n-1.
As the EPC is used in more and more transactions, the cost
of exchange per unit exchanged will thus fall. At the same
time, the number of units that have to be exchanged for
national currencies will diminish. As more and more inter-
national transactions are settled in EPC, it pays increasing-
ly to hold EPC working balances instead of working balances
of national currencies. The fewer the currencdfis which_ need to be
held in the portfolio, the cheaper its management'
and - according to the insurance principle - the smaller
the-r ©quired..sAz.e. becomes.These effects will make themselves particularly felt
if the EPC is also increasingly used for domestic
transactions. Since the EPC is superior to the
national currencies Trx -tkat it can be used without
'IS
(or'at least subject to fewer) restrictions in all
member countries and "n -ika£ restrictions of its con-
vertibility are likely to be less stringent and less
enforceable (compare Section 2.2.5), the EPC itself will
soon benefit from economies of scale.
3.4. The Pattern of EPC Penetration and the Theory of the
Optimum Currency Area
In the absence of externalities and market imperfections,
currency competition would be bound to produce optimum,
currency areas. Since the EPC has- been shown to give rise
to a number of real-income externalities, it has to be asked
whether these external effects are economies or diseconomies,
The preceding analysis has shown that both from a micro-
economic and from a macroeconomic point of view an EPC
of constant EC purchasing power would permit important
welfare gains, i.e. that the external effects which any
individual decision in favour of the EPC would have on
other currency users are, on balanco^of a positive nature.
In the following these benefits . wj"ll be related to the
"optimality" criteria which the theory of the optimum
currency area has developed.
"3»4.1. Microeconomic Efficiency of Transactions
It has been pointed out that currency unification is the
more beneficial, the smaller and the more operi the
currency areas that are to be merged.One argument advanced
in favour of this proposition is that the economies of
scale in transaction costs and information costs which
currency unification will bring'are the larger,
the higher the proportion of transactions had been with
residents of other currency areas in the past. Since the'
EPC, as has been shown, would tend to penetrate faster
in the smaller and more open member countries than in the
larger ones, the pattern of EPC penetration and hence the
parallel-currency approach seems optimal on"this account.- 61 -
3.^.2. The Macroeconomic Need for Exchange-Rate Adjustment
From a macroeconomic point of view, the sacrifice of ex-
change-rate policy which currency unification implies is the
harder, the greater the need for adjustment between
economies for which exchange-rate variations can be a potent
tool. The need for exchange-rate adjustment is the smaller,
- the smaller the cost of unifying demand management in
the economies to be merged,
- the more diversified they are (law of large numbers), and
- the higher -tL«. factor mobility between them (as a substi-
tute for exchange-rate adjustment).
The cost of a unified demand management within the curren-
cy union (or, initially, the EPC domain) is the larger,
the greater the differences between the Phillips curves
(the short-term trade-off between inflation and unemploy-
ment) and between the inflation/unemployment preferences
of the areas to be merged under the Community currency.
With respect to preferences, the composition of the Community
floating bloc seems to indicate that national propensities
to inflate are presently most similar among the central
Community countries where the EPC, as has been shown, is.
on balance likely to spread fastest. If it is true that
preferences for monetary stability are the result of his-
torical experience, it may not even be a complete coinci-
dence that the present floating bloc covers precisely the
area in which the Hamburg Mark Banco prevailed in the
17th century. Given such differences in national inflation
preferences, it seems important that they are narrowed
in the gradual process which the parallel currency approach
implies.
With regard to the trade-off between inflation and unemploy-
ment, it is beginning to become coiientional wisdom that
the.Phillips curve is highly unstable in the short terra
and almost perfectly vertical in the longer term as
money illusion is eroded, i. e .''inflation is unable to raise- 62 -
employment persistently above the level which would obtain
in conditions of price stability. Since the Phillips curve
depends on money illusion and since the EPC will spread
fastest in areas where money illusion is snallest, EPC
penetration will concentrate on those regions in which the
trade-off between Inflation and unemployment is very simi-
lar( namely low).
Similarity of money (dis-)illusion does not require simi-
larity of expected inflation rates. Hence the parallel-
currency approach can dispense with the costly undertaking
of assimilating the inflation rates of the national member
currencies which the Verner /Approach requires and which ,
owing to the lagged adjustment of price expectations, is
likely to produce unemployment in the disinflating countries
and the build*up of excess capacity in the inflating coun-
try. Instead, national differences in price expectations and
in the historical experience on which they are based,
are made irrelevant through ex post indexation of the
common currency.
As for the second criterion, diversification, it can be
observed that the central regions of the European Communi-
ty possess an industrial structure which is more broadly
based than that of the peripheral areas. Since the EPC,
as has been shown ., ±st on balance likely to penetrate faster
in the central regions the pattern of EPC penetration,
and hence the parallel-currency approach, scores highly
in this respect.
The same is true with regard to the third criterion^ factor
mobility. Currency unification acts to increase factor
mobility within the unified area (the EPC domain) because
costs of exchange, exchange risks, convertibility risks and
currency information costs are all eliminated within the
currency area. Thus currency unification is self-justifying -
it is a precondition for its own optimality.• - 63 -
3.4.3« The Macroeconomic Efficiency of Exchange-Rate
Adjustment
It has been argued that nominal exchange-rate variations
are the less efficient in bringing about interregional
adjustment and thus stable equilibrium, and that the loss
of the exchange-rate instrument which currency unification
implies is therefore the less costly, the more open the
currency areas to be merged. The reason given is that
exchange-rate illusion diminishes as openness increases.
At the same time the efficiency of demand management in
adjusting the balance of payments grows. It has been
objected that under fixed exchange rates openness
implies at the same time an equivalent reduction in the
efficiency of demand management with regard to price-level
stabilisation; in short, open economies are in even greater
need of the exchange-rate cushion in order to protect
themselves against the importation of inflation and the
exportation of price stability. Moreover, apart from such
nominal exchange-rate adjustments, exchange-rate x:>olicy
can serve to bring about real exchange-rate changes as
long as there is still some exchange-rate illusion, how-
ever small, which can be exploited. Why, in those circumstan-
ces, give up the instrument of exchange-rate policy?
Both objections, while valid in the usual case, fail to
apply to currency unification through a parallel curren-
cy of constant EC purchasing power. Since the EPC will
penetrate fastest in the most open member economies,
it will protect them against inflation instead of de-
priving them of their'protection. And since the EPC will
mostly be demanded as a protection against inflation by people
with little or no money and exchange-rate illusion,
it does not prevent the national member governments from
exploiting the money and exchange-rate illusion which
still persists.- 64 -
3^-k.k. The Resource Cost of Increased Exchange-Rate
Transparency
Currency unification facilitates international price
comparisons. By reducing these information costs it is like-
ly to encourage demands for "pay parity" within the
unified area, even where "productivity parity" does not
exist. If workers in low-productivity regions demand
and obtain a reduction in the real-wage differential
vis-a-vis workers in high-productivity regions which
is not justified by a corresponding reduction of the
productivity differential, unemployment In the backward
regions will rise. This resource cost of currency unification
will be the smaller, the more similar the /marginal value)
productivity (of labour) and productivity growth, re-
spectively, in the regions of the unified currency area.
As should be expected from the theory of regional economics,
the backward areas in the European Community are the
peripheral regions; the central regions in which the ,
EPC,as has been shown, should spread in the first place,
are the most industrialised. Hence the parallel-currency
approach would help to delay the disadvantages of currency
unification. By destroying money illusion with wage ear-
ners (i.e. by reducing the "wage lag") in the industrial
centre, the EPC of constant EC purchasing power may in
fact help to raise real wages in the centre as compared
with real wages at the periphery and thus be an instrument
of regional policy.
3.4.5* The Theory of the Optimum Currency Area Made Operational
The analysis of the prospective process and the pattern of
EPC penetration shows that the parallel-currency approach
presents many characteristics of an optimal currency
unification process. In particular, it is a way of im-- 65 -
proving the pattern of currency areas during the
transitional phase. While the theory of the optimum currency
area has often been criticised as irrelevant because
its object is to determine the best possible frontiers
for a currency area rather than the desirability of uni-
fying a given setaf currency areasj the parallel-currency
approach, by providing for shifts of the frontiers bet-
ween the EPC domain, on the one hand, and the national
currency areas, on the other, makes the theory of the
optimum currency area operational.
4. Conclusion: The Parallel-Currency Approach in Monetary History
Vhile the political future of the parallel-currency pro-
posal does seem uncertain, it is interesting to note that
on several occasions in the past it has successfully'been
adopted either to bring about currency unification or
to deal with inflation. Within the Community, quite apart
from the Hamburg Mark Banco, German monetary history in
particular offers a number of striking examples:
- In 1838, four years after the foundation of the German
Customs Union, the Dresden Coin Convention agreed to
create a Union coin (2 Thaler) which circulated side
by side with the national currencies.
In 1857, the Vienna Coin Treaty provided for three
a,
more union coins (one Crown, half^Crown and one Thaler)
and extended their circulation to Austria. Especially
the union Thaler coins soon outcompeted the state
coins which, over the period up to the forcible
monetary unification of Germany in ig7i, accounted for
less than 3 percent of the total coin issue.
In 1923» the German government created a parallel cur-
rency of constant gold value backed by real assets,
the so-called Rentenmark, which made substantial inroads
into the circulation of the hyperinflating Rexchsmark
until the latter was stabilised. The Rentenmark was
preceded by public and private issues of
Emergency Money of guaranteed purchasing power.- 66 -
Europe's present parallel currency, though an inflating one,
is the Eurodollar. It pwes this role to the choice of the
market. This is also how the (Spanish) Dollar (=Thaler)
became- the North American parallel currency in the 18th
century. Following the outbreak of the Revolutionary War,
Congress introduced dollar bills (the "continentals") as
a parallel legal tender besides Sterling (1775) and,in
1785,declared the dollar "the money unit of the United States
of America" while in most member states Sterling was still
the dominant .VLnlt of account, while Sterling notes were
still issuecrand while many foreign coins remained in cir-
culation. Strictly speaking, the dollar remained a parallel
currency for the United States until 1857 when all foreign
currencies were deprived of the status of legal tender.
And it became a parallel currency in other countries —
very soon in Canada and, in the form of the "trade dollar"
(1873)1 in international transactions.